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1 
PRIVATE POLICING OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: AN EMPIRICAL 
ASSESSMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL LEAD PLAINTIFFS IN TRANSACTIONAL 
CLASS AND DERIVATIVE ACTIONS       
BY DAVID H. WEBBER* 
 
Transactional class and derivative actions have long been 
controversial in both the popular and the academic literatures.  Yet, the 
debate over such litigation has thus far neglected to consider a change in 
legal technology, adopted in Delaware a dozen years ago, favoring 
selection of institutional investors as lead plaintiffs in these cases.  This 
Article fills that gap, offering new insights into the utility of mergers and 
acquisitions litigation.  Based on a hand-collected dataset of all 
Delaware class and derivative actions filed from November 1, 2003 to 
December 31, 2009, I find that institutional investors play as large of a 
role in these cases as they do in federal securities fraud class actions, 
leading 41% of them.  Controlling for the size of the deal and other 
factors, institutions have been more likely to assume a lead role in cases 
with lower premiums over the trading price, at least until the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008, at which point most institutional 
types increased their litigation activity and sued in higher premium deals 
too.  Other case and deal characteristics significantly predict 
institutional lead plaintiffs, such as the number of complaints filed in the 
case (an illustration of lead plaintiff competitiveness), the length of the 
complaint (a measure of attorney effort), whether the transaction is cash-
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for-stock, the market capitalization of the target, and the presence of 
"Go-Shop" provisions (which negatively correlate with institutional lead 
plaintiffs).  I also find that public-pension funds, in particular, target 
controlling shareholder transactions.   
I present evidence that public-pension funds, alone among 
institutional types, statistically significantly correlate with the outcomes 
of greatest interest to shareholders—both an increase in the offer price 
and lower attorneys' fees.  The improvement in offer price associated 
with public-pension funds may be because they are better shareholder 
representatives.  It may also be because they "cherry-pick" the best 
cases, although I offer some evidence against this hypothesis.  These 
results are consistent with the view that public-pension funds outperform 
traditional lead plaintiffs as monitors of class counsel and that they 
reduce agency costs for shareholders in mergers-and-acquisitions 
litigation. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The debate over transactional class and derivative actions 
continues to rage both inside and outside academia.1  In the most typical 
case, the shareholders of the target company sue the target's board of 
directors and the board of the acquirer.2  Often, the shareholders allege 
that the target board, aided and abetted by the acquirer, breached its 
Revlon duties by failing to maximize the price for the target's shares.3  
Complaints in such cases tend to include allegations that material 
information about the transaction has not been disclosed, and that the 
defendants have consented to coercive deal terms that stifle the bidding 
process or otherwise force the target shareholders to accept a low bid.4     
Popular and academic commentators are divided over the utility of 
such litigation.5  Some have argued that every deal faces litigation, that 
 
                                                                                                             
 
1
See, e.g., C.N.V. Krishnan, et al., Shareholder Litigation in Mergers and 
Acquisitions, 18 J. CORP. FIN. 1248, 1265 (2012) ("[T]he expected rise in takeover premia 
[from deals litigation] more than offsets the fall in the probability of deal completion."); 
Robert M. Daines & Olga Koumrian, Merger Lawsuits Yield High Costs and           
Questionable Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2012, available at 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/08/merger-lawsuits-yield-high-costs-and-questionable-
benefits/ [hereinafter Daines & Koumrian, Merger Lawsuits] ("Litigation can be effective in 
protecting shareholder interests in some deals, but questioning every deal seems to impose 
excessive costs on the companies involved and their shareholders."); Jessica Silver-Greenberg, 
Why Merger Lawsuits Don't Pay, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 2011, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904009304576530742353849726.html 
(observing that the number of merger lawsuits are growing but questioning whether the suits 
"result in tangible awards"). 
2
See Daines & Koumrian, Merger Lawsuits, supra note 1 ("According to a study by 
Cornerstone Research and Robert M. Daines, companies that were sold for more than $100 
million in 2010 and 2011 reported more than 1,500 lawsuits filed against them and the 
directors of the target companies."). 
3
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) 
("[When] the break-up of the company [is] inevitable . . . . [t]he duty of the                        
board . . . change[s] from the preservation of [the company] as a corporate entity to the 
maximization of the company's value at a sale for the stockholders' benefit."). 
4
See Krishnan et al., supra note 1, at 1248; Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. 
Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 133, 144 (2004).  
5
Compare Daines & Koumrian, Merger Lawsuits, supra note 1 (noting that while 
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the overwhelming majority of such cases are frivolous, that the only 
people who benefit from these cases are the lawyers, and that the costs of 
these suits outweigh their benefits to shareholders.6  Others have taken 
the opposite view, that the litigation costs are overblown and that 
shareholders benefit from such litigation.7  But what has been missing 
from this debate is an assessment of this litigation in light of a crucial 
change in legal technology, adopted in Delaware over a decade ago, 
favoring the selection of institutional investors as lead plaintiffs.8  This 
legal innovation was designed to address several of the critiques of such 
litigation, but its implementation has never been empirically assessed.9  
This Article fills that gap.  It makes clear, as demonstrated below, that 
there are multiple tiers of transactional litigation, and that a nuanced 
assessment of its merits should account for the identity of the lead 
plaintiffs—whether they are individuals or institutions—and of equal if 
not greater importance, what type of institutions they are.10   
This decade-old innovation in mergers-and-acquisitions litigation 
in Delaware, which has long served as the main arena for such cases,11 
was part of a broader paradigm shift in aggregate shareholder litigation, 
originating with a seminal law review article, Let The Money Do The 
Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in 
                                                                                                             
litigation is sometimes necessary and valuable, challenging every deal is unlikely to be in 
shareholder interests), with Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 207 ("[Although] 
[s]hareholder litigation has often been cast in the role of the evil stepsister of modern corporate 
governance . . . . the acquisition-oriented shareholder class actions filed in Delaware add value, 
even if they also have costs."). 
6
See Daines & Koumrian, Merger Lawsuits, supra note 1; see also Elliott J. Weiss & 
Lawrence J. White, File Early, Then Free Ride: How Delaware Law (Mis)Shapes Shareholder 
Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1797, 1806 (2004) ("Delaware law relating to mergers and 
class actions created a litigation environment that was rife with potential for opportunistic 
behavior by the plaintiffs' bar[,] . . . plaintiffs' attorneys generally responded by behaving 
opportunistically[,] and . . . Delaware's courts did not effectively protect corporations or their 
shareholders from the resulting litigation-related agency costs."). 
7
See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 140 ("Placing our findings in the historical 
context of the debate over the value of representative shareholder litigation, we believe that 
acquisition-oriented class actions substantially reduce management agency costs, while the 
litigation agency costs they create do not appear excessive."). 
8
See e.g., TCW Tech. Ltd. P'ship v. Intermedia Commc'ns, Inc., 2000 WL 1654504, at 
*4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 2000) (holding that the institutional shareholders should serve as lead 
plaintiff).  
9
See infra pp. 29-31. 
10
See infra Part V.   
11
See ROBERT M. DAINES & OLGA KOUMRIAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, 
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS—FEBRUARY 2013 
UPDATE 4-6 (2013), available at http://www.cornerstone.com/getattachment/199b1351-aba0-
4f6d-92f0-24b50f4a4b29/ shareholder-Litigation-Involving-Mergers-and-Acqui.aspx.  
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Securities Class Actions.12  In this Article, Elliot Weiss and John 
Beckerman argued that courts should favor selection of institutional 
investors as lead plaintiffs in federal securities fraud class actions.13  
Weiss and Beckerman argued that financially and legally savvy 
institutional investors with large stakes in the outcome of the case would 
have both the motivation and sophistication to litigate thoroughly and 
monitor class counsel.14  In contrast, the unsophisticated individual lead 
plaintiffs who dominated class actions at that time had little incentive or 
ability to monitor class counsel because they had small stakes in their 
cases and were often hand-picked by plaintiffs' lawyers.15  In 1995, 
Congress enshrined the Weiss and Beckerman proposal in the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA").16  Five years later, the 
Delaware Court of Chancery adopted a similar presumption, favoring 
selection of institutional-investor lead plaintiffs in mergers-and-
acquisitions class and derivative actions.17   
The emergence of institutional-investor lead plaintiffs in federal 
securities fraud class actions has been studied in numerous academic 
articles, including two by this Author.18  This is the first piece to examine 
their role in the context of mergers-and-acquisitions cases, which differ 
in fundamental respects from securities fraud class actions;19 we should 
 
                                                                                                             
12
Elliot J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How 
Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 
2053, 2126-27 (1995). 
13
Id. at 2105 ("Courts would benefit [if] institutional investors with large stakes in 
class actions [were] to serve as lead plaintiffs."). 
14
Id. at 2095 ("Institutions' large stakes give them an incentive to monitor, and 
institutions have or readily could develop the expertise necessary to assess whether plaintiffs' 
attorneys are acting as faithful champions for the plaintiff class."). 
15
Id. at 2054 ("[A]ttorneys operating on a contingent fee basis initiate most such suits 
in the names of 'figurehead' plaintiffs with little at stake."). 
16
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006).   
17
See TCW Tech. P'ship v. Intermedia Commc'ns, Inc., 2000 WL 1654504, at *4 (Del. 
Ch. Oct. 17, 2000) ("[I]t seems appropriate, at least, to give recognition to large shareholders 
or significant institutional investors who are willing to litigate vigorously on behalf of an entire 
class of shareholders, provided no economic or other conflicts exist between the institutional 
shareholder and smaller, more typical shareholders."). 
18
See David H. Webber, The Plight of the Individual Investor in Securities Class 
Actions, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 157 (2012) [hereinafter Webber, Plight]; David H. Webber, Is 
"Pay-to-Play" Driving Public Pension Fund Activism in Securities Class Actions?, 90 B.U. L. 
REV. 2031 (2010) [hereinafter Webber, Pay-to-Play]. 
19
Some of the most obvious differences between securities fraud class actions and 
mergers-and-acquisitions class actions include that the former very often run parallel to SEC 
or other governmental investigations, and involve accounting restatements.  See infra notes 
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not assume that a successful innovation in one of these types of litigation 
can automatically be transplanted to the other.  I elaborate upon this 
point below.20     
This Article aims to answer three primary questions pertaining to 
institutional-investor leadership of deal cases in Delaware.  First, have 
institutions accepted Delaware's invitation to serve as lead plaintiffs, and 
if so, what case and deal characteristics attract them?21  Second, are 
certain types of institutions—subdivided into public-pension funds, 
labor-union funds, mutual funds, and the catchall "private non-mutual 
funds"—more inclined to litigate period, or to litigate certain types of 
cases or deals?22  Third, do institutions generally, and certain types of 
institutions specifically, correlate with better case outcomes for 
shareholders?23  To offer short answers to each of these questions, I find 
that: first, institutions have obtained 41% of lead plaintiff appointments 
since Delaware adopted a rule favoring their selection,24 and they tend to 
obtain these appointments in cases where shareholders are offered low 
premiums and comparatively unfavorable deal terms.25  Presumably, 
these are the cases we would want them to litigate, ex ante.  Second, 
there is some variation between institutional types regarding the deal and 
case characteristics with which they are affiliated.26  For example, public-
                                                                                                             
121-22 and accompanying text.  Institutional lead plaintiffs and their lawyers are frequently 
accused of free riding off of these governmental investigations in securities fraud class actions.  
See infra note 123 and accompanying text.  Such governmental investigations are much less 
frequent in the context of mergers-and-acquisitions litigation, depriving institutions and their 
law firms of the free ride they may or may not enjoy in 10b-5 cases.  See UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AGENCIES, http://www.justice.gov/agencies/index-list.html (last 
visited Jan. 17, 2014) (the DOJ investigates securities fraud through the US Attorney’s Office, 
but only investigates antitrust elements of mergers and acquisitions); see also UNITED STATES 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, ENFORCEMENT DIVISION, About 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/about.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2014) (discussing the 
SEC’s role in investigating securities fraud but not discussing mergers and acquisitions or 
investigation under the Williams Act); see also DELAWARE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL,  Fraud Division, http://attorneygeneral.delaware.gov/office/fraud.shtml (last visited 
Jan. 17, 2014) (discussing investigation into securities fraud but not discussing investigation 
into mergers and acquisitions). Moreover, securities fraud class actions often accompany 
voluntary financial restatements by the company, which are often tantamount to an admission 
of liability.  See infra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.  Similar admissions of wrongdoing 
rarely occur in the transactional litigation context.  See infra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 
20
See discussion infra pp. 20-22. 
21
See infra Parts IV.A, V. 
22
See infra Part V.B. 
23
See infra notes 431, 484 and accompanying text. 
24
See infra note 184 and accompanying text. 
25
See infra p. 74-77. 
26
See discussion infra Part V.B. 
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pension funds target controlling-shareholder acquisitions.27  Third, I find 
evidence that public-pension funds—alone among institutional types—
correlate with improved share price and lower attorneys' fees for target 
shareholders.28  Given that these funds constitute the most frequent 
institutional lead plaintiffs,29 their case selection and case performance 
offer some support for the policy favoring selection of institutional-
investor lead plaintiffs. 
In addressing these questions, this Article advances two lines of 
corporate law scholarship:  the shareholder-activism literature, and the 
shareholder-litigation literature.30  First, it advances the scholarship on 
shareholder activism, which focuses on the objectives, methods, and 
circumstances under which investors—particularly institutional 
investors—engage corporate boards and fellow shareholders for the 
purpose of influencing the business decisions or governance structures of 
corporations.31  Litigation has commonly been understood as one form of 
shareholder activism, albeit an extreme and confrontational form.32  
Below, I argue that institutional participation in mergers-and-acquisitions 
litigation is a form of shareholder activism, and is best understood in 
light of the prior research on such activism.33  This literature helps 
contextualize why certain institutional types pursue (or avoid) lead 
plaintiff appointments in deal litigation, and what types of cases we 
might expect them to select.34  Second, the shareholder-litigation 
literature helps frame the data presented here within the larger debate 
over the utility of mergers-and-acquisitions litigation, and shareholder 
 
                                                                                                             
27
See infra pp. 55-56. 
28
See infra Part VI.A, C.   
29
See infra Table 2. 
30
See infra Part III. 
31
See John Armour & Brian R. Cheffins, The Rise and Fall (?) of Shareholder 
Activism By Hedge Funds 2 (European Corporate Governance Institute, Working Paper No. 
136/2009, September 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1489336 [hereinafter 
Armour & Cheffins, Rise and Fall]  ("Shareholder activism has been described as 'the exercise 
and enforcement of rights by minority shareholders with the objective of enhancing 
shareholder value over the long term.'" (quoting Chee Keong Low, A Road Map for Corporate 
Governance in East Asia, 25 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 165, 186 (2004))).   
32
See Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, On Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence on the 
Developing Role of Public Pension Funds in Corporate Governance, 61 VAND. L. REV. 315, 
316 (2008) (summarizing CalPERS' monitoring of securities fraud class action suits and 
"influential role in the high-profile Cendant litigation" as a model of institutional activism). 
33
See infra at III.B. 
34
See infra at III.B. 
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litigation generally.35  It helps assess the performance of institutional 
investors in the lead plaintiff role, specifically, whether the lead plaintiffs 
adequately represent the class, and whether they successfully select and 
monitor class counsel.36  Do the lead plaintiffs control class counsel, or 
does class counsel control the lead plaintiffs?  As discussed more fully 
below, I find some evidence that institutions appear to be exercising 
judgment independent of their lawyers;37 the finding that public-pension 
funds correlate with lower attorneys' fees38 is also particularly important.  
Thus, this Article takes the natural next step in developing these two 
lines of corporate law scholarship.  
The Article proceeds as follows:  Part II provides some 
background on transactional litigation and discusses Delaware law for 
selecting lead plaintiffs in such cases, comparing it to federal law.39  Part 
III contextualizes this Article within the shareholder litigation and 
shareholder activism literatures, as noted above.40  Part IV describes the 
sample and basic statistics.41  Part V discusses the case characteristics 
associated with institutional lead plaintiffs generally, and with various 
types of institutional lead plaintiffs specifically, public-pension funds, 
labor-union funds, mutual funds, and private non-mutual funds.42  Part VI 
analyzes the relationship between institutional lead plaintiffs, plaintiffs' 
law firms, case characteristics, and case outcomes.43  A brief conclusion 
follows.44   
 
                                                                                                             
35
See infra at III.B. 
36
See infra at III.B. 
37
See infra Part VI.A. 
38
See infra Part VI.C. 
39
See infra Part II. 
40
See infra Part III. 
41
See infra Part IV. 
42
See infra Part V. 
43
See infra Part VI. 
44
See infra Part VII. 
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II.  THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SELECTING INSTITUTIONAL LEAD 
PLAINTIFFS IN DELAWARE AND BEYOND 
A.  Delaware Law for Selecting Lead Plaintiffs in Transactional Class 
and Derivative Actions 
In TCW Technology Limited Partnership v. Intermedia 
Communications, Inc., the Delaware Court of Chancery established 
criteria for the selection of lead plaintiffs and lead counsel in Delaware 
transactional class and derivative actions.45  The court developed these 
criteria in response to a lead plaintiff contest between three sets of 
claimants:  traditional shareholder claimants, institutional shareholder 
claimants, and derivative claimants.46  Although the Delaware Court of 
Chancery traditionally resisted becoming embroiled in lead plaintiff 
disputes, encouraging the contestants to reach an agreement on their 
own,47 in TCW Technology, the parties could not agree, forcing the court 
to decide.48  In its opinion, the Delaware Court of Chancery noted that, 
"[o]ver the past ten years, members of the Court of Chancery have been 
asked, with increasing frequency, to become involved in the sometimes 
unseemly internecine struggles within the plaintiffs' bar over the power 
to control, direct and (one suspects) ultimately settle shareholder lawsuits 
filed in this jurisdiction."49  The court held that in making the lead 
plaintiff selection, it should consider the following factors:  (1) "the 
quality of the pleading that appears best able to represent the interests of 
the shareholder class and derivative plaintiffs[;]" (2) which "shareholder 
plaintiff has the greatest economic stake in the outcome of the lawsuit[;]" 
and (3) "whether a particular litigant has prosecuted its lawsuit with 
greater energy, enthusiasm or vigor than have other similarly situated 
litigants."50  The opinion notes that the second factor "is similar to the 
federal system that now uses a model whereby the class member with the 
largest economic interest in the action is given responsibility to control 
 
                                                                                                             
45
TCW Tech. Ltd. P'ship v. Intermedia Commc'ns, Inc., 2000 WL 1654504, at *4 (Del. 
Ch. Oct. 17, 2000). 
46
Id. at *1.  
47
See id. at *3. 
48
Id. ("[The] attempt to encourage a similar compromise of competing interests in 
these shareholder actions, unfortunately, has failed."). 
49
TCW Tech., 2000 WL 1654504, at *3. 
50
Id. at *4. 
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the litigation."51  In applying these criteria, Chancellor Chandler selected 
two institutional investors as co-lead plaintiffs.52 
In June 2002, the Delaware Court of Chancery settled on final 
criteria for lead plaintiff selection.53  In Hirt v. U.S. Timberlands Service 
Company, LLC, the court held that it would consider the following 
factors:  (1) the "quality of the pleading[;]" (2) "the relative economic 
stakes of the competing litigants . . . (to be accorded 'great weight');" (3) 
"the willingness and ability of the contestants to litigate vigorously on 
behalf of an entire class of shareholders;" (4) "the absence of any conflict 
between larger, often institutional, shareholders and smaller 
shareholders;" (5) "the enthusiasm or vigor with which the various 
contestants have prosecuted the lawsuit;" and (6) "competence of counsel 
and their access to the resources necessary to prosecute the claims at 
issue."54 
As I demonstrate below, the "great weight" accorded to the relative 
economic stakes of the contestants has ushered in a period of substantial 
participation of institutional-investor lead plaintiffs in Delaware, in some 
ways paralleling the increased participation of these investors in federal 
securities fraud class actions.55  But even though they share the same 
objectives, there are meaningful differences between the PSLRA 
standard and Delaware law.56  The PSLRA created a rebuttable 
presumption that "the most adequate plaintiff . . . is the person or group 
of persons   that . . . in the determination of the court, has the largest 
financial interest in the relief sought by the class[.]"57  In adopting this 
provision, Congress endeavored "to increase the likelihood that 
institutional investors will serve as lead plaintiffs."58  Congress believed 
that plaintiff-attorney agency costs could be reduced if the lead plaintiff 
 
                                                                                                             
51
Id.; accord 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006). 
52
TCW Tech., 2000 WL 1654504 at *4 ("Based on these considerations, I conclude 
that the institutional shareholders . . . should serve as lead plaintiff, with all of the other 
shareholder actions consolidated with the two institutional lawsuits for purposes of the 
scheduled preliminary injunction hearing."). 
53
Hirt v. U.S. Timberlands Serv. Co., 2002 WL 1558342, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 9, 2002). 
54
Id. 
55
See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERSLLP, 2011 SEC. LITIG. STUD. 27 (Apr. 
2012), available at http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2011-
securities-litigation-study.pdf (noting that institutional investors, including public and union 
pension funds, represented 38% of the lead plaintiffs in securities cases filed in 2011). 
56
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb)-(cc). 
57
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb). 
58
S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 11 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690. 
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had a large enough stake in the outcome to be incentivized to monitor 
class counsel, and if the lead plaintiff were sufficiently sophisticated to 
act on its incentive skillfully.59   
Probably the most meaningful difference between the PSLRA and 
Delaware law is that Delaware's "relative economic stakes" language is 
more flexible than the federal standard because it can be read to let 
courts assess the size of the lead plaintiff applicant's stake both 
absolutely and relative to its own portfolio.60  For example, in In re Del 
Monte Foods, the court, for several reasons, selected as lead plaintiff a 
pension trust that owned 25,000 shares worth $475,000 and representing 
0.07% of its assets under management instead of a European asset 
manager for private and institutional clients that held 1,899,900 shares 
worth $36 million and representing 0.02% of its assets under 
management.61  Despite the latter applicant's far larger absolute stake, the 
relative stakes of the two applicants were approximately equal.62  In 
contrast, the PSLRA created a rebuttable presumption that the entity with 
the largest absolute stake in the case is the presumptive lead plaintiff, 
even if that stake represents a trivial investment for the applicant.63  As I 
have argued elsewhere, I view the flexibility of the Delaware approach as 
superior to the federal approach because it implicitly acknowledges that a 
lead plaintiff's incentive to monitor class counsel—a key role of a lead 
plaintiff—may be a function of how important the investment is to that 
lead plaintiff, relative to its entire investment portfolio.64  But despite this 
comparative advantage, I maintain that, in practice, the Delaware process 
for selecting a lead plaintiff omits a vital step in screening lead plaintiffs.  
The Delaware process does not require disclosure of, and makes no effort 
 
                                                                                                             
59
See id. (demonstrating intent to increase the likelihood that institutional investors be 
chosen as lead plaintiff); see also Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 12, at 2105-06 (suggesting 
the basis for the "most adequate plaintiff" provision). 
60
See Webber, Plight, supra note 18, at 171 ("[I]n contrast to federal courts' 
congressional mandate to favor lead plaintiffs with the largest absolute loss, Delaware's 
'relative economic stakes' language has opened the possibility for selection of  a lead plaintiff 
with the largest loss relative to its own assets."). 
61
In re Del Monte Foods Co. S'holders Litig., 2010 WL 5550677, at *6 (Del. Ch. Dec. 
31, 2010). 
62
Id. at *6-*7. 
63
Id. at *5. 
64
See Webber, Plight, supra note 18, at 171 ("[I]n In re Del Monte Foods Co. 
Shareholders Litigation, Vice Chancellor Laster noted the size of lead plaintiff applicants' 
losses relative to their overall assets under management in selecting a lead plaintiff that had a 
smaller absolute but larger relative loss. . . . In re Del Monte [establishes] that the incentive to 
monitor class counsel stems, at least in part, from the relative size of the investor's loss."). 
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to assess, lead plaintiff applicants' stakes in the bidder(s).65  It only 
assesses their stakes in the target.66   
As a lead plaintiff, an institutional investor should typify the class 
of target shareholders and zealously advocate on its behalf.67  "The 
institution must strive to maximize the price paid for the class's shares by 
the acquirer, augment disclosures, and create an open bidding process in 
the hope that the class will benefit from a bidding war."68  But as I have 
noted in prior work, "institutional investors' interests may run counter to 
these objectives" when they also hold shares in the acquiring company.69  
"The dollars they win as members of the target class are dollars they lose 
as an acquirer shareholder, and vice versa.  If the institutional investors' 
stake in the acquirer is greater than their stake in the target, their net 
financial incentive is to lower the bidding price, not increase it."70  It is 
true that, in most instances, the self-interest of institutional-investor lead 
plaintiff applicants, combined with the fiduciary responsibilities of 
representing the target-shareholder class, should incentivize the 
institutions to correctly calibrate their interests in the target and the 
acquirer on their own, without disclosure.71   
Still, the lack of disclosure may cause problems.  It may cause 
institutions not to check what their stake in the acquirer is, not least 
because the plaintiffs' attorneys monitoring their portfolios have no 
incentive to check, and because it may be difficult to assess the size of 
their stake if the fund utilizes many outside investment managers.72  
Moreover, funds that have a larger stake in the bidder than the target 
might proceed in the lead plaintiff role anyway because of private 
 
                                                                                                             
65
See id. at 207 (noting that an institution should not serve as a lead plaintiff if its 
financial interest in the bidder outweighs its interest in the target). 
66
See id. 
67
See DEL CT. CH. R. 23(a)(3) ("One or more members of a class may sue or be sued 
as representative parties on behalf of all only if . . . the claims or defenses of the representative 
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class . . . .").  
68
Webber, Plight, supra note 18, at 206.  See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986) (creating a duty for the board to get the best 
possible price for the shareholders once the company is for sale).  But cf. Barkan v. Amsted 
Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989) (holding that the fulfillment of Revlon duties 
during a change of control does not always require the administration of an auction). 
69
Webber, Plight, supra note 18, at 206. 
70
Id. 
71
See In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 404 F.3d 173, 198 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting lead 
plaintiffs are fiduciaries for the class they represent).   
72
See Webber, Plight, supra note 18, at 167 (discussing institutions' portfolio-
monitoring arrangements with plaintiffs' law firms). 
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benefits to its own board members, such as favorable publicity for a 
pension fund trustee who is an elected official.73  And in the extreme 
case, institutions with a stake in the bidder that exceeds the target might 
even obtain a lead plaintiff appointment for the purpose of thwarting the 
litigation.74  This might seem farfetched, but the market has seen similar 
mercenary behavior in the empty-voting context.75  In a previous article, I 
proposed a mechanism by which courts should require disclosure of a 
prospective lead plaintiff's position in the acquirer, as well as in the 
target, and for disqualifying the proposed lead plaintiff under certain 
circumstances.76   
I raise this issue here because it is possible that institutional lead 
plaintiffs' bidder stakes could predict the cases they pursue, and their 
performance.77  This Article offers no analysis of this potential 
explanatory variable because the data is unavailable.78  I note that, if it 
were available, it might well reveal that the lead plaintiff applicant's 
stake in the bidder plays little or no role as an explanatory variable 
 
                                                                                                             
73
See id. at 207 ("[P]oliticians serving on a fund's board might win favorable publicity 
by using the fund's lead plaintiff status to win concessions from the bidder in favor of the          
target, particularly if the target is located within the politician's constituency and employs     
voters.").  
74
See id. at 208 ("[A]n institutional investor could obtain lead plaintiff status for the 
purpose of thwarting the litigation."). 
75
See e.g., Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and 
Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 816 (2006) (describing instances of 
insiders and hedge funds using derivative investments to decouple voting rights and economic 
stakes in order to achieve a result contrary to the interests of shareholders whose voting and 
economic rights were integrated). 
76
See Webber, Plight, supra note 18, at 207 (proposing that an institution should not 
serve as a lead plaintiff if its financial interest in the bidder outweighs its interest in the target). 
77
See id. at 167 (noting that better outcomes result for shareholders in securities class 
actions when institutional investors serve as lead plaintiffs). 
78
One potential source of this data is the Form 13-Fs that institutional investors with 
assets in excess of $100 million are required to file with the SEC.  See Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 § 13(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f) (2012); U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, FORM 13F—REPORTS FILED BY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT MANAGERS, 
available at http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/files/2012/03/Cornerstone_Research_Shareh
older_MandA_Litigation_03_2012.pdf.  But Form 13-Fs have been filed for virtually none of 
the public-pension funds in my sample because most of these funds utilize outside investment 
managers, often several outside managers, and it is these investment managers—and not the 
funds themselves—that file the Form 13-Fs.  See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(f), 15 
U.S.C. § 78m(f)(1) (2012) (establishing that institutional investment managers are responsible 
for filing such reports with the Commission).  Investment manager Form 13-Fs do not reveal 
the amount of their clients' funds that are invested in particular stocks.  See C.S. Agnes Cheng 
et al., Institutional Monitoring Through Shareholder Litigation, 95 J. FIN. ECON. 356, 362 n.21 
(2010).     
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because institutional investors have strong economic and legal incentives 
not to take a lead plaintiff role representing a shareholder class that is 
actually litigating against its interests, as outlined above.79  But one 
cannot exclude the possibility that bidder stake could impact case 
selection and performance.80 
III.  PRIOR LITERATURE 
As noted in the Introduction, this Article sits at the intersection of 
two strains of corporate law scholarship: the shareholder-litigation 
literature, and the shareholder-activism literature.81  The relevant 
shareholder-activism literature focuses on the types of institutional 
investors that engage in such activism and the types of activism they 
engage in, ranging from litigation to proxy contests, say-on-pay 
initiatives, or behind-the-scenes campaigns designed to influence the 
direction or governance of a publicly-held company.82  The literature on 
private securities and corporate litigation focuses on the agency costs of 
class counsel, the deterrent and compensatory effects of such litigation, 
and cost-benefit analyses of it.83  I will briefly outline these scholarly 
domains.  Later in this Article, I will rely upon them to interpret and 
contextualize my data and its implications for further research.84 
A.  Private Securities and Deal Litigation 
The purpose of private securities and transactional litigation is to 
provide shareholders with a tool for policing a broad range of managerial 
misconduct.85  It is well understood that the separation between corporate 
 
                                                                                                             
79
See Webber, Plight, supra note 18, at 206. 
80
See id. at 219 (noting that although better outcomes result for shareholders in 
securities class actions when institutional investors serve as lead plaintiffs, this could be due to 
"cherry-picking" the best cases). 
81
See supra text accompanying note 30.  
82
See Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional 
Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 479, 482 (1991) (describing types of institutional 
investors, including public-pension funds and private funds, and the types of activism they 
engage in, including corporate governance proposals and proxy contests).  
83
See e.g., Cheng et al., supra note 78, at 357 (describing agency costs, deterrent and 
compensatory effects of litigation, and the cost-benefit analysis of securities litigation).   
84
See supra Part VII. 
85
See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 144-45 (concluding that securities class 
actions, like state court shareholder suits, are generally brought over corporate governance and 
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ownership and control generates agency costs, creating managerial 
interests that are distinct from those of the shareholders.86  Delaware law 
recognizes the potentially dramatic rise in such managerial agency costs 
in the context of a merger or acquisition.87  For example, in responding to 
a hostile offer, the board of directors may institute defensive measures 
such as a poison pill to stop a transaction that would benefit 
shareholders, but strip the board and management of the perks of their 
positions.88  In a friendly deal, target managers may tolerate a lower price 
in exchange for private benefits such as generous severance packages or 
an employment contract with the new combined entity.89  In management 
buyouts or controlling shareholder acquisitions, managers, and the board, 
may both face direct conflicts of interest between negotiating a low 
acquisition price for themselves or the controlling shareholder and 
maximizing the price for shareholders.90   
                                                                                                             
managerial performance). 
86
See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 66 (Revised ed. 1968) (discussing how corporate development has led to 
the separation of ownership and control); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory 
of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 
305, 309 (1976) (explaining how agency costs are generated by the separation of corporate 
ownership and control). 
87
See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (declaring 
that boards have an "enhanced duty" in the context of mergers-and-acquisitions because of the 
"the omnipresent specter" that is a breach of the duty of loyalty to shareholders); see also 
Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 145 (stating that Delaware's imposition of additional 
duties on directors in a merger context are due to the risk of increased agency costs in that 
setting). 
88
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Exclusive Merger Agreements and Lock-Ups in 
Negotiated Corporate Acquisitions, 75 MINN. L. REV. 239, 273 (1990) ("[I]f incumbent 
management defeats the bidder, target directors and officers will retain their positions, but 
target shareholders will lose a substantial premium for their shares.").  See generally Lucian 
Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 973 
(2002) (providing a thorough treatment of the board's authority to block unsolicited bids). 
89
See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 145 (explaining that in friendly 
acquisitions there is the "constant fear" that target management will sell too cheaply in 
exchange for personal benefits, such as severance packages or continued employment); see 
also Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 
118 (1965) (deducing that whenever there is a merger there is some side-payment to the target 
management because they are in the position to garner almost all of the "control premium" 
over the market price of the stocks for themselves).  For an overview of litigated cases 
involving private board member deal benefits, see also, Bainbridge, supra note 88, at 273-74 
(providing overview of litigated cases involving private board member deal benefits). 
90
See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 145; see also Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey 
N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 786 (2003-04) 
(noting that controlling shareholders may exercise private benefits of control either by 
squeezing out the minority shareholders or selling their controlling stake).  But see Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 
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Delaware law offers several means of reducing such agency costs 
in the transactional context.  For instance, the boards of the target and the 
acquirer, as well as a majority vote of the shareholders, must approve 
friendly deals.91  In the absence of a conflict of interest, Delaware courts 
apply the deferential business judgment rule to such transactions.92  In the 
presence of such a conflict, like an acquisition by a controlling 
shareholder, Delaware courts apply "entire fairness" review, a form of 
scrutiny that is more stringent than the business judgment rule, 
developed in a line of cases following Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.93  In the 
mid-1980s, Delaware courts developed a level of intermediate scrutiny 
between Weinberger "entire fairness" and the business judgment rule.94  
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. established this "enhanced 
scrutiny," requiring that in a hostile bidder situation, defensive measures 
instituted by an independent board must be instituted in response to a real 
threat to the target and must be proportional to the threat.95  Finally, in 
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., Delaware courts 
began developing a line of cases requiring the board to have a duty to 
maximize the price for target shareholders in any sale of control of a 
corporation.96  Target shareholders have standing to bring private class or 
                                                                                                             
820 (2006) ("[T]he empirical evidence indicates shareholder premiums are essentially identical 
in management-sponsored leveraged buyouts and arm's length leveraged buyouts.").  See 
generally John C. Easterwood, et al., Controlling the Conflict of Interest in Management 
Buyouts, 76 REV. ECON. & STAT. 512 (1994) (providing an empirical analysis of the 
effectiveness of various methods of combating the conflict of interest that arises when 
managers bid to acquire the firms they manage). 
91
See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b)-(c) (2010) (describing the procedure for the 
board's adoption of a merger agreement); see also Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 145. 
92
See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 146. 
93
See id. (discussing the application of entire fairness review to shareholder 
transactions when a conflict of interest exists and crediting the Weinberger case as first 
announcing this standard); see also Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) 
("When directors of a Delaware corporation are on both sides of a transaction, they are 
required to demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of 
the bargain."). 
94
See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) ("[A]n 
enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the protections of 
the business judgment rule may be conferred."); see also Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, 
at 147 ("Beginning in 1985, the Delaware courts developed an intermediate standard of 
review, more intrusive than the deferential business judgment rule, but short of the entire 
fairness of Weinberger."). 
95
493 A.2d at 955. 
96
506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986); see also Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4 at 147 
("The promise of the Revlon decision itself was that in any sale of corporate control, the target 
company's board of directors had a duty to maximize shareholder value by taking the highest 
price for the company."). 
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derivative actions to enforce these rights against recalcitrant boards or 
managers.97  Such private rights of action should reduce managerial 
agency costs by forcing managers to act in the interests of shareholders 
in the transactional context. 
But litigation to enforce these rights generates costs of its own, 
including agency costs created by the disconnect between the interests of 
plaintiffs' lawyers and those of the shareholder class they represent.98  
Much of the academic debate over such litigation focuses upon whether 
it actually reduces managerial agency costs and, even if it does, whether 
this benefit outweighs the litigation costs.99  For example, Daines and 
Koumrian reviewed reports of mergers-and-acquisitions shareholder 
litigation in SEC filings related to acquisitions of U.S. public companies 
valued over $100 million and announced in 2010 or 2011.100  They found 
that almost all of these transactions triggered several lawsuits, which 
were "filed shortly after the deal's announcement and often settled before 
the deal's closing."101  Few of these lawsuits resulted in tangible monetary 
benefits to shareholders; most settled for additional disclosures or, less 
frequently, changes to the terms of the deal.102  They also found that, 
while requiring additional disclosures is a common outcome, there were 
no cases in which shareholders rejected the deal after the additional 
disclosures were provided.103  In another study, Cain and Davidoff 
 
                                                                                                             
97
See Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance:  
Protecting Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 218 
(1999). 
98
See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class 
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1, 19 (1991) (attributing high agency costs in class action and derivative litigation 
primarily to the inability of the class to effectively monitor the attorneys).   
99
Compare Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 207 ("[W]e conclude that the 
acquisition-oriented shareholder class actions filed in Delaware add value, even if they also 
have costs."), with Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the 
Derivative Suit in Corporate Law:  A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. 
REV. 261, 282 (1986) (concluding that derivative suits do not have a material impact on the 
firm's managerial agency costs and its shareholders because of the insignificant magnitude of 
the shareholder's wealth-effects). 
100
ROBERT M. DAINES & OLGA KOUMRIAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, RECENT 
DEVELOPMENT IN SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING MERGERS AND         
ACQUISITIONS—MARCH 2012 UPDATE  1 (2012), available at 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/files/2012/03/Cornerstone_Research_Shareholder_Mand
A_Litigation_03_2012.pdf.  
101
Id. at 1. 
102
Id. at 11. 
103
Id.; see also Brittany M. Giusini, Note, Pure Resources' "Fair Summary" Standard: 
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utilized a nationwide dataset and reported that, between 2005-2011, there 
was a sharp increase in the percentage of transactions valued at more 
than $100 million that were targeted by a lawsuit, from 39.3% to 92.1%, 
raising concerns about the frivolousness of such litigation.104      
In contrast, Krishnan, Masulis, Thomas, and Thompson ("KMTT") 
examine merger activity from 1993 to 2001.105  Controlling for a variety 
of factors, they found that mergers-and-acquisitions subject to litigation 
were completed at a significantly lower rate than those not subject to 
litigation.106  They also found that mergers-and-acquisitions subject to 
shareholder litigation have significantly higher premiums in takeover 
deals.107  And they found that, in merger waves with friendly single-
bidder offers, shareholder litigation acts as a substitute for the presence 
of a rival bidder by “polic[ing] low-ball bids and lead[ing] to improved 
offer prices."108  Most importantly, they found that "the expected rise in 
the takeover premia [for cases subjected to shareholder litigation] more 
than offsets the fall in the probability of deal completion, resulting in a 
positive expected gain to target shareholders."109  Thus, the KMTT article 
provides evidence that deal litigation benefits shareholders.110  This 
Article takes the next natural step in developing this line of scholarship 
by assessing the types of lead plaintiffs in these cases,111 the case 
characteristics associated with particular institutional types,112 whether 
Delaware's policy favoring selection of institutional lead plaintiffs 
improves outcomes for shareholders and whether certain types of 
institutional investors are particularly effective in the lead plaintiff role.113 
Although I am not aware of another article that assesses the role of 
lead-plaintiff types in transactional litigation, some prior work has 
examined their role in federal securities fraud class actions.114  Michael 
                                                                                                             
Disclosures Away From Obtaining Clarity in the M&A Context, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 595, 619-
25 (2013) (discussing the costs and benefits of increasing disclosures in Delaware).  
 
104
Matthew Cain & Steven Davidoff, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State 
Competition and Litigation, 3 (January 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1984758. 
105
See Krishnan et al., supra note 1, at 1248.   
106
Id. at 1265. 
107
Id. 
108
Id. at 1264. 
109
Krishnan et al., supra note 1, at 1250. 
110
Id. at 1264-65. 
111
See discussion infra Part IV. 
112
See discussion infra Part V. 
113
See discussion infra Part VII. 
114
See generally Michael Perino, Institutional Activism Through Litigation: An 
Empirical Analysis of Public Pension Fund Participation in Securities Class Actions, 9 J. 
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Perino found that, federal securities fraud class action cases with public-
pension lead plaintiffs have larger investor recoveries and significantly 
lower attorney fee requests and awards than cases with other lead 
plaintiffs, even after controlling for institutional self-selection.115  
Similarly, Cheng, Huang, Li and Lobo found that institutional owners 
can use securities litigation as a disciplinary mechanism because     
[securities class actions] with an institutional lead plaintiff 
are less likely to be dismissed and have significantly larger 
settlements. Further analysis indicates that all types of 
institutions show significantly better litigation outcomes 
with public pension funds generating the largest settlement 
amount. We also found that, within three years of filing the 
lawsuit, defendant firms with institutional lead plaintiffs 
experience greater improvement in board independence than 
those with individual lead plaintiffs.116 
Similarly, Choi, Fisch and Pritchard found that, post-PSLRA, public-
pension-fund lead plaintiffs correlate with higher recoveries in securities 
fraud class actions;117 Cox, Thomas, and Bai similarly found higher 
recoveries by both public-pension funds and labor-union funds.118  Thus, 
these studies provide evidence that some institutional-investor lead 
plaintiffs in securities fraud class actions, notably public-pension funds, 
provide better shareholder outcomes in the form of higher settlements, 
lower attorneys' fees, and improved board independence.119 
Still, the substantial differences between transactional litigation 
and securities fraud litigation should make one cautious before importing 
the lessons from one form of litigation to the other.120  First, securities 
                                                                                                             
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 368, 369-70 (2012). 
115
Id. at 369.   
116
Cheng et al., supra note 78, at 358. 
117
See Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & A.C. Pritchard, Do Institutions Matter?  The 
Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 83 
WASH. U. L.Q. 869, 895-96 (2005) [hereinafter Choi et al., Do Institutions Matter?] (analyzing 
outcomes of securities fraud class actions post-PSLRA). 
118
See James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas & Lynn Bai, There Are Plaintiffs and . . . 
There Are Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis of Securities Class Action Settlements, 61 VAND. 
L. REV. 355, 379 (2008).  
119
See Cheng et al., supra note 78, at 357-58; Choi et al., Do Institutions Matter?, 
supra note 117, at 895-96; Cox et al., supra note 118, at 379; Perino, supra note 114, at 369-
70. 
120
See supra note 19. 
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fraud class actions led by institutional lead plaintiffs—and public-
pension funds in particular—often correlate with the presence of a 
simultaneous governmental investigation into the fraud.121  Typically, 
these investigations are conducted by the SEC, though occasionally by 
the U.S. Department of Justice or other government entities.122  This 
correlation has led to speculation that public-pension funds and other 
institutional investors "free ride" off of these investigations,123 although 
some studies suggest that public-pension funds correlate with higher 
settlements even when accounting for a government investigation.124  At 
least one recent study has compared the market reaction to stand-alone 
SEC investigations versus stand-alone private securities class actions, in 
part to address claims that securities fraud class actions free ride off of 
governmental investigations, adding little value of their own.125  
Governmental investigations are virtually nonexistent in the context of 
transactional litigation, and thus, there is no parallel investigation for 
public-pensions or other institutions to free-ride on.126  Because I do find 
that public-pension funds correlate with better outcomes for target 
shareholders in deal litigation,127 this Article offers support for the view 
 
                                                                                                             
121
See, e.g., Perino, supra note 114, at 379, 381 ("[P]ublic pension fund plaintiffs are 
significantly more likely to be involved in . . . cases with parallel governmental enforcement 
actions than noninstitutional plaintiffs."). 
122
See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical 
Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1589 n.8 
(2006) (stating that the Securities and Exchange Commission and the U.S. Department of 
Justice are capable of sanctioning violators). 
123
See id. at 1605-06 (suggesting the potential for public-pension funds to free ride off 
of government investigations to minimize the costs incurred). 
124
See, e.g., id. at 1624, 1630-31 (finding that institutional lead plaintiffs correlate with 
higher settlements even when controlling for an SEC investigation); Cox et al., supra note 118, 
at 378-79 ("[S]ettlement size is positively and significantly correlated with . . . the presence of 
an SEC enforcement action."); Perino, supra note 114, at 383-84 (finding a positive correlation 
between public-pension funds securities litigation lead plaintiffs and settlement amounts while 
controlling for governmental enforcement action). 
125
See Stephen J. Choi & Adam C. Pritchard, SEC Investigations and Securities Class 
Actions: An Empirical Comparison, 2, 4-5 (N.Y.U. Center for Law, Economics and 
Organization, Working Paper No. 12-38, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2109739 
(comparing market reaction to stand-alone SEC investigations versus SEC stand-alone 
securities class actions and finding evidence that class actions are superior to SEC 
investigations in targeting fraud and imposing sanctions on companies). 
126
See SEC DIV. OF ENFORCEMENT, ENFORCEMENT MANUAL § 1.4.1 (2012), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf (describing the 
SEC's mission as investigating and litigating only violations of federal securities laws). 
127
See, e.g., Webber, Plight, supra note 18, at 167 ("Overall, the use of institutional 
investors as lead plaintiffs correlates with better outcomes for shareholders in securities class 
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that these funds can vindicate the rights of shareholders on their own, 
without government help.128 
Similarly, it has often been observed that institutional-investor 
lead plaintiffs in federal securities fraud class actions, including public-
pension funds, bring cases when the defendant company has voluntarily 
restated its own financial statements because of accounting 
deficiencies.129  In effect, such actions begin with an admission of 
wrongdoing by the company, thereby greatly aiding securities fraud class 
action plaintiffs in meeting their burden of proof on liability.130  But in 
mergers-and-acquisitions litigation, no admission of wrongdoing akin to 
a financial restatement occurs.131  Thus, studying such litigation affords 
the opportunity to assess the effectiveness of public-pension fund lead 
plaintiffs, and institutional lead plaintiffs generally, when they do not 
have the benefit of an admission of wrongdoing as an alternative 
explanation for their successes.   
There are additional differences between securities fraud and 
transactional class actions that caution against readily applying the 
lessons of one form of litigation to the other.  For example, as discussed 
at length in this piece, diversified institutional investors may often find 
themselves holding stakes in both target and bidder companies.132  Such 
conflicting ownership stakes have the potential to create sharp conflicts 
of interest between shareholders, and could undermine the policy 
favoring selection of institutional-investor lead plaintiffs.133   
Finally, the underlying transactions, the applicable substantive 
law, and the economics of transactional class actions differ greatly from 
                                                                                                             
actions . . . ."). 
128
See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
129
See, e.g., Choi et al., Do Institutions Matter?, supra note 117, at 892 (finding 
significant correlation between institutional lead plaintiffs and the presence of a fraud-related 
earnings restatement or SEC investigation); see also Perino, supra note 114, at 379, 381 
("[P]ublic pension fund plaintiffs are significantly more likely to be involved                           
in . . . RESTATEMENT cases . . . than noninstitutional plaintiffs.").  
130
Compare Choi et al., Do Institutions Matter?, supra note 117, at 895 (excluding 
accounting restatements unrelated to fraud), with Perino, supra note 114, at 378-79, 383 
(including all restatements and concluding public-pension funds still correlate with better 
outcomes for shareholders). 
131
See supra note 19. 
132
See infra notes 167-69 and accompanying text; see also Webber, Plight, supra note 
18, at 205 (stating the possibility of institutional investors owning shares in bidder as well as 
target companies). 
133
See Webber, Plight, supra note 18, at 205-06 (discussing the conflict that exists 
when institutional investors hold stakes in both target and bidder companies and the potential 
for focus on the bidder company over the target company). 
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securities fraud class actions.134  Transactional class actions require less 
commitment of time and resources from both lead plaintiffs and lead 
counsel for a number of reasons.  For instance, they are not subject to the 
onerous pleading requirements of the PSLRA, nor to the bar on 
discovery prior to a motion to dismiss that so substantially increases the 
costs to plaintiffs in federal securities fraud class actions.135  In addition, 
the PSLRA creates a strong presumption that the lead plaintiff applicant 
with the largest absolute loss be selected as the lead plaintiff.136  As 
discussed earlier in Part II, Delaware law is more flexible, emphasizing 
the "relative economic stakes" of the applicants.137  Consequently, lead 
plaintiff selection may be less predictable in Delaware than at the federal 
level, affecting both institutional case selection and outcomes.  And 
while no one enjoys being a defendant in any lawsuit, the stigma, if any, 
that attaches to defendants for not abiding by Revlon would seem to have 
less of a negative reputational impact than would an accusation of fraud.  
No one goes to jail for violating Revlon.  And while the threat of 
withdrawal of insurance coverage due to actual fraud may impact the 
dynamics of a securities fraud case, such threats are infrequent—if not 
nonexistent—in the context of transactional class actions, where fraud is 
rarely alleged.138  
Thus, it is important to let the data tell the story of institutional 
lead plaintiffs in transactional litigation.  That story is told below.  But 
there is one final point to be made before it begins. 
 
                                                                                                             
134
See infra notes 135-38 and accompanying text. 
135
See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319-21 (2007) 
(presenting the heightened standards that apply to securities fraud class actions and 
recognizing that ordinary civil actions only require a "short and plain statement" of their claim, 
as is required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)). 
136
See, e.g., Webber, Plight, supra note 18, at 166 ("As Congress intended, federal 
courts have since interpreted the PSLRA's 'largest financial interest' clause to mean the largest 
absolute loss.  Thus, whichever individual or entity incurs the largest loss and moves for the 
position becomes the presumptive lead plaintiff." (footnote omitted)).  
137
See supra note 54 and accompanying text; see also Webber, Plight, supra note 18, 
at 166 ("Delaware courts weigh the 'relative economic stakes' of competing lead plaintiff 
movants in the outcome of the lawsuit, which suggests the possibility that the lead plaintiff that 
has the most at stake relative to its own assets, and not on an absolute scale, could be 
appointed lead plaintiff." (footnotes omitted)). 
138
See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, How the Merits Matter: Directors' and Officers' 
Insurance and Securities Settlements, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 802 (2009) (reporting that the 
fraud exclusion of insurance policies is often raised in settlement talks and, therefore, does not 
have the impact that would be anticipated). 
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B.  Shareholder Litigation As A Form of Shareholder Activism 
"Shareholder activism has been described as 'the exercise and 
enforcement of rights by minority shareholders with the objective of 
enhancing shareholder value over the long term.'"139 Understanding the 
landscape of institutional shareholder activism offers some context for 
assessing what types of institutions one might expect to obtain lead 
plaintiff appointments in transactional litigation, and why.  The literature 
divides shareholder activism into two broad categories:  ex ante or 
"offensive" activism and ex post or "defensive" activism.140  Ex ante or 
offensive activists "first determine whether a company would benefit 
from activism, then take a position and become active."141  Typically, 
hedge funds fall into this category.142  Hedge funds profit by engaging in 
targeted hedges rather than by diversifying.143  Among those funds that 
engage in activism, it is likely that they do so as a principal investment 
strategy, rather than an isolated effort.144  As Kahan and Rock put it, 
"activism presumably entails learning, with funds that have done more of 
it becoming better at it, and funds with an activist reputation more easily 
attracting support from other investors and inducing management 
changes."145  Such funds rely upon a value-investing approach, rather 
than quantitative theories of finance.146  The managers of these funds are 
often former investment bankers, seeking out underperforming assets to 
invest in by studying balance sheets, income statements, and other 
information.147  The managers' activist strategies might include "share 
 
                                                                                                             
139
Armour & Cheffins, Rise and Fall, supra note 31, at 2 (quoting Low, supra note 31, 
at 186). 
140
See Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future of 
Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51, 56-57 (2011) (describing the 
difference between "offensive" and "defensive" shareholder activism). 
141
Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. Rev. 1021, 1069 (2007). 
142
See id. 
143
See id. at 1070 ("[T]hey engage in targeted hedges, rather than diversification, to 
eliminate unwanted risks."). 
144
See, e.g., id. ("To be a successful activist, it is probably helpful for a fund to engage 
in activism as a principal strategy . . . ."). 
145
Kahan & Rock, supra note 141, at 1070. 
146
See Armour & Cheffins, Rise and Fall, supra note 31, at 3-4. 
147
See e.g., id. at 4 (observing that managers of activist hedge funds analyze corporate 
fundamentals to find underpriced and underperforming stock). 
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buy-backs, spinoffs, mergers, or [changes to] the composition of the 
board of directors[]."148 
In contrast, ex post or "defensive" shareholder activism occurs 
"when fund management notes that portfolio companies are 
underperforming, or that their governance regime is     deficient . . . ."149  
Such activists tend to be public-pension funds or labor-union funds, and 
to a lesser extent, mutual funds.150  These investors employ 
diversification strategies in which they seek to reduce, if not eliminate, 
firm-specific risk while approximating a market rate of return.151  These 
strategies reduce research costs and minimize investigation into 
particular business decisions.152  Such funds may gain from activism that 
improves profitability across markets as a whole, as "universal owners" 
with long-term investment horizons to match long-term liabilities in the 
form of retirement benefit payments.153  An ex post or defensive 
shareholder activist does not own enough shares to win boardroom 
control or dictate corporate policy,154 "but potentially can use their stake 
as a departure point in garnering support for the changes they 
advocate."155  Thus, these funds have pushed for reforms that may be 
applied to a broad swath of companies, like splitting the role of chairman 
of the board and chief executive officer, or pressing for an end to 
classified boards.156  In pursuing these goals, these funds have relied upon 
academic research demonstrating that such governance reforms improve 
share-price performance and, more consistently, Tobin's Q, a measure of 
firm value.157  Such strategies may be pursued, and have been pursued, at 
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Kahan & Rock, supra note 141, at 1043. 
149
Id. at 1069. 
150
See id. at 1042 (noting that traditional institutions, such as public-pension funds and 
mutual funds, have historically made resolutions relating to issues of corporate governance 
rules). 
151
See, e.g., id. at 1043 ("To the extent that the 'activism' takes the form of merely 
voting in favor of proposals by others (or against proposals made by the company's board), it 
represents a rather passive form of 'activism.'"). 
152
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 141, at 1044. 
153
See id. at 1070 ("[M]utual funds [and other traditional institutions] view and market 
themselves as vehicles for diversification, which enables their investors to gain broad exposure 
to markets at low costs."). 
154
See Armour & Cheffins, Rise and Fall, supra note 31, at 56. 
155
Id. 
156
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 141, at 1070; see also Shareholder Rights Project, 
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, http://srp.law.harvard.edu/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2013). 
157
See Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity 
Prices, 118 Q. J. ECON. 107, 107 (2003) (finding that strong shareholder rights result in higher 
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many companies via precatory shareholder resolutions at relatively low 
cost because they require little or no specific firm knowledge prior to 
implementation.158  They have also been pursued via shareholder 
litigation, at least at the federal level.159   
It is fair to ask whether transactional litigation fits squarely into 
either ex ante/"offensive" or ex post/"defensive" activism.160  In some 
respects, it does not.  For example, most transactional litigation is 
brought in deals that will ultimately close.161  Litigating shareholders 
usually hope that the deals will close—in friendly deals that they will 
close at a higher price than what the board approved,162 and in hostile 
deals that they will close at all, in spite of board opposition.163  
                                                                                                             
firm value, profits, and sales growth, lower capital expenditures, and fewer corporate 
acquisitions); see also Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in 
Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783, 785 (2008) (finding increases in the 
entrenchment index are monotonically associated with economically significant reductions in 
firm valuation during the 1990 to 2003 period); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Charles 
C.Y. Wang, Learning and the Disappearing Association Between Governance and Returns, 
108 J. FIN. ECON. 323, 346-47 (2013) (providing evidence that the disappearance of the 
correlation between stock returns and governance indices in the 2002 to 2008 period was due 
to market participants' gradually learning to appreciate the difference between strong and poor 
governance firms, and that the indices' negative association with Tobin's Q and operating 
performance nevertheless persisted).  Contra John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & Tjomme O. 
Rusticus, Does Weak Governance Cause Weak Stock Returns? An Examination of Firm 
Operating Performance and Investors' Expectations, 61 J. FIN. 655, 657, 659 (2006) (finding 
that evidence does not support a causal relationship between poor governance and weak stock 
returns). 
158
See James F. Cotter, Anil Shivdasani & Marc Zenner, Do Independent Directors 
Enhance Target Shareholder Wealth During Tender Offers?, 43 J. FIN. ECON. 195, 197 (1997) 
(concluding that independent outside directors enhance target shareholder gains from tender 
offers).  See generally Kenneth Lehn, Sukesh Patro & Mengxin Zhao, Governance Indexes 
and Valuation: Which Causes Which?, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 907, 908 (2007) (finding evidence that 
firms with low valuation multiples were more likely to adopt provisions comprising the 
governance indices, not that the adoption of these provisions depresses valuation multiples). 
159
See Shareholder Activism, EUR. CORP. GOVERNANCE INST., (Feb. 19, 2013), 
http://www.ecgi.org/activism/index.php (discussing shareholder activists' reliance on academic 
research, connecting corporate governance with shareholder performance). 
160
See Armour & Cheffins, Rise and Fall, supra note 31, at 2-3 (contrasting 
"defensive" activism, the agitation for change by an investor with a pre-existing sizeable stake 
in a company looking to protect that stake, with "offensive" activism, the practice of 
increasing one's stake in a company with the expectation that non-profit-maximizing practices 
will be changed, and advocating for that change if necessary). 
161
See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 198 (finding that friendly deals subject 
to litigation closed over 65% of the time and hostile deals subject to litigation closed about 
64% of the time). 
162
See id. at 164. 
163
See id. (claiming that when prospective acquirers sue, the ultimate goal is for the 
deal to go through, rather than any specific outcome for the litigation). 
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Consequently, the target will cease to exist as an independent entity, and 
the shareholders will either be cashed out, or will find themselves 
owning shares of the new, combined entity.164  Thus, in one sense, the 
benefits of deal litigation may be short term and temporary, rather than 
systemic and permanent.165   
But one might also take the view that the benefits of such litigation 
are, in fact, systemic and permanent, of the type that might be pursued by 
diversified, long term, universal owners with pre-existing stakes in the 
target.166  While it is true that the target itself will cease to exist, 
diversified shareholders may benefit market-wide from a well-run private 
policing regime to the extent that private enforcement makes it more 
difficult for target boards to implement defensive measures (like poison 
pills or classified boards).167  Also, litigation may make it more difficult 
for such boards to manipulate transactional bidding processes to extract 
private benefits at the expense of shareholders in friendly-deal situations, 
(at least insofar as the private policing regime's costs are outweighed by 
these benefits).168  Challenging mechanisms of director entrenchment 
might enhance the overall value of a diversified portfolio by making it 
more difficult for boards to inhibit value-enhancing acquisitions or 
otherwise undermine the market for corporate control.169 
In fact, as demonstrated below, these cases are dominated by 
public-pension funds and labor-union funds.170  Mutual funds and hedge 
funds play a minimal role in transactional class and derivative actions,171 
and I find little or no evidence that these funds ever take a stake in a 
company for purposes of engaging in such litigation.172  As discussed 
more fully below, institutional-investor participation in these cases 
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See id. at 202. 
165
See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 203. 
166
See John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Shareholder Rights and Legislative 
Wrongs: Toward Balanced Takeover Legislation, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1425, 1478, 1481 
(1990-91).  
167
See id. at 1430-38, n.17, 31, 38, 39.  
168
See id.  
169
See id. at 1504-06 (noting that board entrenchment reduces shareholder value and 
value would increase if eliminated).  But see Jay B. Kesten, Managerial Entrenchment and 
Shareholder Wealth Revisited: Theory and Evidence from a Recessionary Financial Market, 
2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1609, 1617 (2010) (finding firms that were less entrenched generated 
lower returns than firms that were more entrenched, but noting there may be other contributing 
factors). 
170
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 141, at 1042. 
171
See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 143-44. 
172
See id. 
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coheres best with ex post/"defensive" shareholder activism, in which 
shareholders with a pre-existing stake in the target company bring suit.173  
I will revisit the shareholder activism discussion below in light of my 
data.174   
IV.  THE SAMPLE 
I began with a hand-collected dataset comprising all 454 
shareholder-derivative and class action lawsuits filed in the Delaware 
Court of Chancery from November 1, 2003 to December 31, 2009.175  I 
obtained this data directly from Lexis-Nexis File and Serve, which is 
utilized by the Delaware Court of Chancery as its electronic filing 
system.176  I began collecting data from November 2003 because that is 
when the Court of Chancery first instituted use of this system.177  I 
searched all cases from this time period using the Clerk of the Court's 
own search field category for "derivative and class actions".  I ended my 
collection in 2009 because, at the time of collection, this seemed the 
most reasonable date by which I could still expect that a substantial 
number of filed cases would be completed.   
Of these 454 cases, I identified 290 (64%) as class or derivative 
actions brought in mergers-or-acquisitions cases.178  Among these deal 
cases, 97% were brought as class actions, with the remaining cases 
brought as derivative actions.179  Of the 454, 8 cases were brought as both 
class and derivative actions.180  Though I include all of these deal cases in 
basic statistics, I exclude cases filed on or after September 15, 2008 from 
the regressions below.  As I explain, the collapse of Lehman Brothers on 
that date wrought substantial changes in deal litigation, providing an 
interesting portrait of how litigation changes in a time of crisis.181  
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See Matheson & Olson, supra note 166, at 1503-05. 
174
See supra Part IV.A. 
175
Every Table throughout this Article is based on this Sample. 
176
See, Electronic Filing in the Delaware Judiciary, JUDICIAL BRANCH OF THE STATE 
OF DELAWARE, http://courts.delaware.gov/efiling/index.stm (last visited Dec. 27, 2013). 
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See id. 
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See infra Table 1. 
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See infra Table 1. 
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See infra Table 1. 
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See infra p. 48. 
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Median (mean) case length for pre-Lehman deal cases is 278 (368) 
days.182 
A.  Basic Statistics—Institutional Lead Plaintiff Characteristics 
An obvious first conclusion from the data presented here is that 
institutional investors have accepted Delaware's invitation to participate 
as lead plaintiffs in these suits.183  Table 1 demonstrates that, of the 290 
mergers-and-acquisitions cases filed from November 1, 2003 to 
December 31, 2009 in the Delaware Court of Chancery, institutional lead 
plaintiffs served in approximately 41% (118/290) of them.184  This figure 
has remained fairly constant year-over-year, with exceptions being 2006 
and 2007, in which institutional participation reached a high of 51% and 
a low of 32%, respectively.185  
 
Table 1: Number of Deal Cases by Year and Lead Plaintiff Type 
Year Number of Cases Institutional LP no. (%) 
    2003186 10 4 (40.00) 
2004 40 15 (37.50) 
2005 59 24 (40.68) 
2006 43 22 (51.16) 
2007 46 15 (32.61) 
2008 35 15 (42.86) 
2009 57 23 (40.35) 
Total 290 118 (40.69) 
 
While the overall rate of institutional participation has remained 
fairly constant, the type of institutional-investor lead plaintiff has 
changed over time.187  In particular, public-pension and labor-union fund 
 
                                                                                                             
182
See infra p. 48. 
183
See infra Table 1. 
184
See infra Table 1. 
185
See infra Table 1. 
186
Figures for 2003 are for November and December alone. 
187
See infra Table 2. 
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participation has increased dramatically, coinciding with a sharp decline 
in participation by private non-mutual funds.188  
 
 
Table 2: Number of Cases With At Least One Institutional Lead Plaintiff 
Type by Year189 
 
Year  
Public-
Pension 
Union 
Mutual 
Fund 
Private Non-
Mutual 
Total 
  2003190 0 0 0 4 4 
2004 0 2 1 12 15 
2005 1 4 3 21 29 
2006 3 2 1 19 25 
2007 8 3 1 7 19 
2008 8 5 0 5 18 
2009 12 12 1 2 27 
Total 32 28 7 70 137 
 
Increased public-pension fund participation may reflect the 
prevalence of portfolio monitoring by plaintiffs’ law firms.  Many 
institutions interested in obtaining lead plaintiff appointments enter into 
portfolio monitoring arrangements with plaintiffs' law firms, often 
several firms.191  The law firms directly access the investment portfolios 
of the institutions via the funds' accounts with custodial banks.192  In 
many instances, the law firms will discover a potential fraud or a 
suspiciously unattractive deal, and notify institutions with significant 
 
                                                                                                             
188
See infra Table 2. 
189
Note that multiple institutional types may appear as lead plaintiffs in the same case. 
Thus, if a public-pension fund appears in the same case as a labor-union fund, they would 
count once towards each column.  This explains why the total here is greater than the 118 
cases with at least one institutional lead plaintiff. 
190
Figures for 2003 are for November and December alone. 
191
See William B. Rubenstein, What We Now Know About How Lead Plaintiffs Select 
Lead Counsel (and Hence Who Gets Attorneys Fees!) In Securities Cases, 3 CLASS ACTION 
ATT'Y FEE DIG. 219, 219-20 (2009) ("[S]ome plaintiffs firms have entered into arrangements 
whereby they monitor the funds' investments for irregularities and suggest possible grounds for 
litigation. . . . MissPERS has monitoring agreements with a dozen firms . . . ."). 
192
See id. at 219. 
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exposure that they may qualify for lead plaintiff status.193  Once notified 
of the fraud or suspicious transaction, institutions typically issue a 
request for proposals to the firms monitoring their portfolios.194  The 
proposals state the law firms' assessments of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the case, argue whether the fund should or should not 
pursue it, and, of course, if the fund does pursue it, why it should select 
that firm as lead counsel.195  Thus, the mere fact that plaintiffs' lawyers 
monitor public-pension fund portfolios may lead the funds to bring 
federal securities fraud class actions or transactional class actions. 
Some critics of securities fraud class actions and the relationships 
between plaintiffs' lawyers and public-pension funds, such as the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, have argued that the funds' participation in such 
suits is the product of "pay-to-play".196  They argue that plaintiffs' 
lawyers contribute to politicians who serve on pension-fund boards in 
exchange for those politicians selecting the lawyers as lead plaintiffs in 
securities class actions.197  A similar logic would apply to transactional 
class actions.  I have argued in a separate empirical article that I believe 
pay-to-play allegations are overstated, and that other factors appear to be 
driving the funds' litigation activism.198  Some researchers have argued 
that pay-to-play may affect attorneys' fees, rather than the decision to 
bring suit in the first place.199   
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See, e.g., id. at 220 ("Coughlin Stoia would provide free monitoring services of the 
Funds' investments and would suggest that the Fund bring securities class actions if it found 
any irregularities.  In return, if the Fund did choose to bring suit, Coughlin Stoia would be 
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See id. at 219-20 ("MissPERS claims it is able to play each [monitoring firm] off 
against the other in terms of determining the fee arrangement."). 
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See Rubenstein, supra note 191, at 219 (describing plaintiffs firms' actions in 
monitoring arrangements); see also Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 572 Pension Fund v. Cisco 
Sys., Inc., 2004 WL 5326262, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2004) (indicating that nothing about 
the monitoring arrangements between firms and Funds prevents the Funds from serving as 
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See Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber Says Overturning 
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http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2009/august/us-chamber-says-overturning-
stoneridge-case-will-harm-investors-job-creat (insisting that the system of securities class 
action litigation is rife with abuse, including "pay-to-play" arrangements). 
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See id. 
198
See Webber, Pay-to-Play, supra note 18, at 2033. 
199
See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Drew T. Johnson-Skinner & A.C. Pritchard, The Price of 
Pay to Play in Securities Class Actions, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 650, 651 (2011) 
(observing that while state pension funds as lead plaintiffs generally achieve lower attorneys' 
fees, state pension funds with managers who received large campaign contributions from lead 
 
2014] PRIVATE POLICING OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 31 
 
It is also possible that the relatively high percentage of public-
pension-fund lead plaintiffs in 2008 and 2009 reflect increased litigation 
activism by the funds in response to losses incurred during the recession 
that began in 2007.200  These funds may have decided to become more 
aggressive on the litigation front in an effort to make up for their losses 
and to help close the gap between the funds' assets and their liabilities.201  
It is true that litigation by all institutional types increased sharply after 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, perhaps reflecting 
similar concerns across all institutions, though it should be noted that the 
uptick in public-pension-fund participation precedes the full onset of the 
crisis.202   
Still, because of the purported financial guarantees provided to 
them by taxpayers, sporadic instances of corruption, and the more 
confrontational approach they have taken with corporate management, 
both in courtrooms and at shareholder meetings, public-pension funds 
have been subjected to unusually harsh assessments of their investment 
performance.203  Public pressure may have prompted them to be proactive 
in making up for losses caused by the financial crisis, including through 
increased litigation activism.204  Additional data from the coming years 
will enable us to determine if this uptick in their mergers-and-
acquisitions litigation activism was a temporary product of the crisis or 
something else.   
In addition, these funds' successful record as lead plaintiffs in 
these suits may encourage them to bring more of them.  As demonstrated 
below in Tables 12 and 14, public-pension funds are the only institutions 
that statistically significantly correlate with the outcomes of utmost 
interest to shareholders—an increase from the offer price to the final 
                                                                                                             
attorney firms did not); see also Webber, Pay-to-Play, supra note 18, at 2081 (providing 
evidence against the theory that pay-to-play drives pension-fund participation in securities 
litigation).   
200
See Webber, Pay-to-Play, supra note 18, at 2036 (noting public-pension fund board 
members have incentives to both recover fund losses and advance the fund's bottom line). 
201
See id. 
202
See supra Table 2. 
203
See, e.g., Tom Petruno, Public Pension Funds Forced on Defensive, L.A. TIMES, 
Dec. 5, 2004, at C1 (quoting David Hirschmann, then senior vice president of the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, calling CalPERS' activist approach "a labor agenda in corporate 
governance clothing," highlighting the irony of calls to terminate a fund active in corporate 
governance because of its own mismanagement, and drawing attention to CalPERS' below 
trend performance during the dot-com bust). 
204
See id. 
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price, and lower attorneys' fees.205  This record may make shareholders 
more inclined to apply for the lead plaintiff role, and may make judges 
more inclined to select them for the role.  Similarly, the increase in 
public-pension-fund participation in Delaware mergers-and-acquisitions 
litigation may be the slightly delayed by-product of their increased 
participation in federal securities fraud class actions.206  The successful 
participation by these funds in securities fraud class actions may have 
motivated them to expand their litigation activity into the transactional 
space as well.  The reverse may also be the case, although it appears that 
the increase in public-pension-fund activity in securities fraud litigation 
preceded that in deal litigation.207 
Labor-union funds comprise 16.5% of lead plaintiff appointments 
in federal securities fraud class actions—a higher percentage than that 
obtained by public-pension funds208—but they are somewhat less active 
than their public counterparts in Delaware deal litigation, as shown in 
Table 2.209  There are a number of possible explanations for this.  One 
might attribute their less frequent participation than public-pension funds 
to their smaller size, but, of course, this disadvantage at the lead plaintiff 
selection stage is just as true in federal securities fraud class actions as it 
is in Delaware.210  And as noted above, unlike federal law, Delaware law 
lacks a rebuttable presumption that the individual or entity with the 
largest stake in the case be the lead plaintiff.211  Delaware considers the 
relative economic stakes of the lead plaintiff applicants.212  Ironically, 
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See infra Tables 12, 14. 
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because of this more flexible approach, Delaware law should be more 
favorable to the selection of labor-union lead plaintiff applicants than is 
federal law, at least for applicants competing against larger public 
pension funds.  Nevertheless, public-pension funds' larger absolute stakes 
may give them an advantage at the lead plaintiff selection stage under 
other Hirt factors, such as the quality of the lead counsel, as superior 
counsel may prefer to work with larger public-pension funds who can 
serve as repeat players, or the willingness and ability of the lead plaintiff 
applicant to litigate vigorously, which may advantage funds with more 
resources.213   
Still, even if we assume that these larger stakes do confer 
advantages upon public-pension applicants, Delaware judges often avoid 
selecting lead plaintiffs themselves, instead requesting that the lead 
plaintiff applicants reach their own agreements about the structure of the 
lead plaintiff group.214  It is therefore possible that labor-union funds 
could often obtain co-lead plaintiff appointments with larger public-
pension funds, if they insisted upon it.  Instead, relatively low labor-
union-fund participation in these suits may reflect their decision to free 
ride off of public-pension fund efforts.   
Of course, this would also be true for federal securities class 
actions.  The difference may lie in the fact that there are far fewer 
Delaware transactional cases than federal securities class actions.215  It 
may be that labor-union funds are inclined to bring the same cases as 
public-pension funds at the transactional level, but that they are 
interested in bringing different cases at the federal level.  Or they are 
interested in bringing more cases than public-pension funds do, and there 
are still numerous federal securities cases "left over" for them to lead, 
                                                                                                             
2012) (citing Hirt v. U.S. Timberlands Serv. Co., 2002 WL 1558342, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 3, 
2002)) (according "great weight" to the relative economic stakes of the candidates for lead 
plaintiff in the outcome of the suit). 
213
See Hirt, 2002 WL 1558342, at *2 (noting factors for lead plaintiff selection such as 
the quality of lead counsel or the willingness and ability of the lead plaintiff). 
214
See, e.g., TCW Tech. Ltd. v. Intermedia Commc'ns, Inc., 2000 WL 1654504, at *3 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 2000) (dictum) ("In every single instance that I am able to recall, this Court 
has resisted being drawn into [lead plaintiff appointment] disputes."). 
215
My data show there were 224 transactional and derivative class action filings in 
Delaware between November 2003 and the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy on September 15, 
2008, while there were 904 federal securities class action filings over the same                     
time period.  See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, Securities Class Action Filings—2013                                  
Mid-Year Assessment, 3 fig. 2, at 3 (2013),   available at 
http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse_research/2013_YIR/Cornerstone-Research-
Securities-Class-Action-Filings-2013-MYA.pdf. 
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whereas there are fewer Delaware transactional cases.  It may also be 
that labor-union funds may sometimes bring cases outside of Delaware, 
though public-pension funds may do the same.216  Finally, labor-union 
incentives in these cases may be more complex than those of public-
pension funds.  For example, union members may be employed by either 
target or bidder companies, thereby complicating the unions' views of the 
proposed transaction.217  This might make them less inclined—or more 
inclined—to bring a lawsuit, depending on the circumstances of the 
individual case. 
Mutual funds play little role in Delaware transactional litigation.218  
They served as lead plaintiffs in just seven cases in the sample.219  This is 
consistent with the low rate of mutual fund participation in federal 
securities class actions, and shareholder activism generally.220  This 
clearly reflects a conscious decision by mutual funds to avoid 
participating as lead plaintiffs in these suits.  Mutual funds manage even 
more assets than public-pension funds do, and own substantial stakes in 
the transactions that are the subject of the suits studied in this Article.221  
They are sophisticated and credible,222 and Delaware judges would likely 
be eager to appoint them if they applied.  But they don't.223 
The reasons they do not apply are likely similar to the reasons they 
rarely participate in securities fraud class actions or in shareholder 
activism more broadly.224  The strongest reason is the free rider 
 
                                                                                                             
216
See, e.g., John Armour, Bernard Black & Brian Cheffins, Is Delaware Losing Its 
Cases?, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 605, 611 [hereinafter Armour, Black & Cheffins, 
Losing] (reporting a growing trend of lawsuits over mergers-and-acquisitions transactions  
being brought in jurisdictions outside of Delaware); Cain & Davidoff, supra note 104 
(examining the dynamics of state competition for merger litigation cases). 
217
See, e.g., Webber, Plight, supra note 18, at 160 (noting the conflicting incentives of 
union members employed by both target and bidder companies). 
218
See supra Table 2. 
219
See supra Table 2. 
220
See discussion supra Part III.B. 
221
Compare INV. CO. INST., 2012 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 9 (52d ed. 
2012), available at http://www.icifactbook.org/2012_factbook.pdf (reporting that there were 
over $11.6 trillion invested in mutual funds in 2011), with U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012, 753 tbl.1217 (2012), available at 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s1219.pdf (recording that there were 
$2.928 trillion invested by state and local public-pension funds in 2010). 
222
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 141, at 1048 (recognizing the benefits of mutual 
funds). 
223
See infra notes 224-32 and accompanying text. 
224
See discussion supra Part III.B. 
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problem.225  One question at the heart of shareholder litigation—and of 
shareholder activism more generally—is why anyone, institution or 
individual, would seek a lead plaintiff appointment when all they are 
entitled to collect is their pro rata share of the settlement or verdict?226  
Optimally, one should prefer that someone else bear the costs of serving 
as a lead plaintiff.  For mutual funds that compete with one another, and 
that may face withdrawals annually or even quarterly based on fund 
performance, serving as a lead plaintiff means incurring costs while 
conferring free benefits on your competitors, who, as class members, 
also obtain their pro rata share of settlements or verdicts.227  Thus, it is 
often economically irrational for mutual funds to serve as lead plaintiffs, 
or to engage in shareholder activism more broadly.228  In contrast, public-
pension funds and labor-union funds have no true competitors.229  
Individuals employed by a state or local government entity, or in certain 
capacities by a private company, have their retirement savings 
automatically invested in the public-pension fund or labor-union fund 
associated with their employer.230  If a fund beneficiary is unhappy with 
the fund's performance, the beneficiary's only option is to change jobs, 
not move one's retirement savings to a competitor.231  Thus, while public-
pension funds and labor-union funds still face the free rider problem 
 
                                                                                                             
225
See Rock, supra note 82, at 461-62 (discussing the free rider problem and its 
benefits). 
226
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 141, at 1052-54 (concluding that mutual funds 
should only engage in activism when a fund has a disproportionate stake in the portfolio 
company such that the fund's relative gain over its competition outweighs the costs of the 
activism). 
227
See id. 
228
See id. at 1053-54 (showing the extent to which any benefit derived from mutual 
funds' activism would be diluted by benefit to the competition); see also, e.g., Rock, supra 
note 82, at 473-74 (citations omitted) ("To the extent that money managers are evaluated in 
comparison to other managers and to market indices, such money managers will have no 
selective incentives to engage in actions that improve the performance of widely diversified 
funds across the board.  A change that benefits all will benefit none."). 
229
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 141, at 1065-66 (noting that hedge funds need not 
worry about competitor funds). 
230
See, e.g., id. at 1059 (listing among the differences between public-pension funds 
and hedge funds the fact that public-pension funds do not have to compete in the market for 
capital). 
231
See, e.g., MASS. PUB. EMP. RET. GUIDE, 2 (2012), available at 
http://www.mass.gov/perac/guide/retirementguide.pdf (explaining that contributing to a state-
run retirement system is mandatory for "nearly all" full-time public employees). 
36 DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW [Vol. 38 
 
when serving as lead plaintiffs, or engaging in any activism, they incur 
fewer costs from such free riding than do mutual funds.232   
There are additional reasons why mutual funds often avoid 
shareholder activism and litigation.  First, a substantial component of the 
mutual fund business consists of investing the 401(k) retirement savings 
of public company employees.233  These funds will not want to jeopardize 
this business by suing their customers, the corporate boards, and 
corporate managers that select which mutual fund options to offer their 
employees.234  Second, mutual funds may avoid litigation for "social 
network" reasons.235  Unlike the firefighters, police officers, and teachers 
who sit on the boards of trustees of public-pension funds, mutual fund 
managers are more likely to travel in the same business, social, and 
educational circles as do corporate managers and directors.236  Such 
social-network effects may reduce their participation in aggressive 
activism "within the circle."237  Because mutual funds diversify their 
investments, the kind of activism that would be logical for them to 
pursue bears a closer resemblance to that undertaken by public-pension 
funds, which is based in part on a strategy of pursuing change at a broad 
swath of companies, and thereby potentially alienating many people 
 
                                                                                                             
232
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 141, at 1065-66. 
233
See Frequently Asked Questions About 401(k) Plans, ICI.ORG, 
http://www.ici.org/policy/retirement/plan/401k/faqs_401k (last visited Oct. 11, 2013) (stating 
that 60% of 401(k) assets were held in mutual funds as of September 30, 2012). 
234
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 141, at 1055-56 (demonstrating that mutual funds' 
desire to retain corporate pension accounts contributes substantially to their reluctance to 
engage in shareholder activism); cf. Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 
MICH. L. REV. 520, 602 (1990) (observing that Armstrong World Industries transferred its 
employee savings plan business to Fidelity after Fidelity stopped opposing a Pennsylvania 
antitakeover law that Armstrong supported). 
235
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 141, at 1054 ("Managers of such funds may be 
reluctant to antagonize present or future clients of their parent company with their governance 
activity."). 
236
See id. 1054-55 (explaining that the afflictions that mutual fund management 
companies have with other financial institutions could make those managers hesitant with 
governance activism); Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate 
Governance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 822 (1993) ("The composition of public 
fund boards may also explain why public funds are more active in corporate governance than 
private funds even if private fund managers lack conflicts of interest involving other business 
relations with issuers.").   
237
Cf. Romano, supra note 236, at 822 (arguing that private funds would be less likely 
to engage in activism than public-pension funds because the private-fund managers do not 
receive the same professional benefits by challenging company management). 
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within the social network.238  In addition, as relayed to me by a director of 
corporate governance and associate general counsel at a top mutual fund, 
such funds avoid leading activist campaigns because their financial 
analysts prize, and guard, their access to senior corporate managers.239  
Such analysts prefer that their employers avoid actions that might 
alienate corporate managers who might then refuse to respond to their 
inquiries.240  This is not to say that mutual funds engage in no activism.241  
But they usually allow public-pension funds and labor-union funds to 
take the lead, to become the public face of activist initiatives, following 
the lead of these funds by occasionally voting in favor of their activist 
initiatives.242  Finally, different mutual fund managers within the same 
mutual fund family may hold different stakes in the target and bidder 
companies, and may have adverse interests in the outcome of the suit.243  
Engaging in litigation or activism may raise conflicts within the mutual 
fund family.244  Thus, free-riding competitors, business conflicts, social-
network conflicts, and conflicts within mutual fund families all deter 
mutual funds from obtaining lead plaintiff appointments.245   
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See id. at 818 (citing CalPERS's criticism of Sears, General Motors, ITT, and others 
through its shareholder rights program as an example of a public pension fund's effort to 
influence several companies). 
239
See Gregg Wolper, Shareholder Activism, Mutual Fund Style, MORNINGSTAR (May 
28, 2013), http://ibd.morningstar.com/article/article.asp?id=598082&CN=brf295,http://ibd.mo
rningstar.com/archive/archive.asp?inputs=days=14;frmtId=12,%20brf295 (stating that a 
potential downside to activism is a likelihood of decreased meetings with the companies and 
analysts).   
240
Id. 
241
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 141, at 1069. 
242
See id. at 1043 (reporting that most mutual funds do not seek governance change by 
spearheading shareholder proposals).  There is one form of activism with which mutual funds 
are associated: behind-the-scenes activism.  Id. at 1044.  For example, mutual funds have 
engaged companies outside the public eye to push for confidential voting, board diversity, and 
limitations on targeted stock placements.  Id.   Because such activism takes place behind the 
scenes, it is difficult to quantify.  Still, it is reasonable to infer that such activism is both 
infrequent and ineffective, in part because shareholders who are unwilling to go public with 
their activist demands lack leverage over corporate managers.  Without such leverage, it is 
difficult to discern why managers would accede to activist demands.  See id. at 1044-45 
(discussing regulatory obstacles to the effective coordination by shareholders of such behind-
the-scenes efforts). 
243
See Webber, Plight, supra note 18, at 206. 
244
See id. (finding that those within the mutual fund family may have competing 
interests in the target company). 
245
See supra Part IV.A. 
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I place the remaining institutional investors into a catchall 
category called "private non-mutual funds."246  This category includes a 
small number of hedge funds and other private-entity-investor lead 
plaintiffs.247  It also includes a large number of private entities whose 
business functions or purposes are not readily apparent.248  Overall, 
private non-mutual funds comprise the largest group of institutional lead 
plaintiffs in the sample, serving in the role in 72 of 290 cases.249  These 
funds are discussed in greater detail below in Part V.B.ii.250  For purposes 
of this section, I note that the participation of these funds as lead 
plaintiffs counters those of public-pension and labor-union funds.  Their 
participation has dropped as participation of the latter has risen.251  Such 
funds served as lead plaintiffs in 21 cases in 2005, dropping to just 2 
cases in 2009.252  
One possible explanation for the decline of private non-mutual-
fund lead plaintiffs is that other, larger players are crowding them out.253  
Public-pension funds and labor-union funds may simply have more at 
stake in these cases than do private non-mutual funds, and win lead 
plaintiff appointments accordingly.  Relatedly, Delaware's development 
of clearer standards for its lead plaintiff selection process, favoring larger 
players, may have driven smaller institutional investors or law firms 
without institutional clients to bring cases in jurisdictions outside of 
Delaware, taking these institutions with them.254  Armour, Black, and 
Cheffins provide evidence that Delaware has been losing cases to other 
jurisdictions, and that part of this trend may be related to Delaware's 
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See supra Table 2. 
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See supra Table 1.  Hedge funds participated as lead plaintiffs in only eight cases in 
the sample. 
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Cf. SEC, MUTUAL FUNDS: A GUIDE FOR INVESTORS, 5 (2007), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/sec-guide-to-mutual-funds.pdf (recognizing that investment 
types such as "hedge funds" and "funds of hedge funds" are not mutual funds).  
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See supra Table 1. 
250
See infra Part V.B.ii. 
251
See supra Table 2. 
252
See supra Table 2. 
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See TCW Tech. Ltd. P'ship v. Intermedia Commc'ns, Inc., 2000 WL 1654504, at *4 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2000) (holding that when deciding which plaintiff to pick for the lead 
plaintiff position, one factor to consider is how much each plaintiff shareholder has at stake in 
the outcome of the lawsuit). 
254
See Armour, Black & Cheffins, Losing, supra note 216, at 650-51 (finding support 
for the hypothesis that Delaware's use of a multi-factor analysis to appoint a lead plaintiff 
rather than a first-to-file basis is causing smaller firms to bring suit in other fora). 
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adoption of lead plaintiff selection criteria.255  As a general observation, 
this trend suggests that some of the results in this Article may be 
understated, particularly those in the latter half showing correlations 
between institutional lead plaintiff types and case outcomes.256  
Individuals, smaller institutions, and their lawyers, attempting to litigate 
weaker cases, may find themselves unable to compete for lead plaintiff 
and lead counsel appointments in Delaware.257  Therefore, they take their 
lawsuits elsewhere.258  If these weaker cases, led by plaintiffs with less 
ability to monitor counsel, were included in the sample, the contrast 
between, for example, public-pension-fund lead plaintiffs and traditional 
lead plaintiffs might be even greater than presented here.     
Before concluding this section, it is worth revisiting the 
shareholder-activism literature outlined above in light of these data on 
institutional-investor participation.259  As noted, it is debatable whether 
mergers-and-acquisitions litigation fits squarely within the types of 
activities that would normally be thought of as shareholder activism, in 
part because if the litigation succeeds, the target of the activism will 
disappear.260  The usual objective of such suits is a quick bump in price, a 
classic short-term strategy.261  Yet, in other ways, these data show that 
deal litigation may fit into the strategic/incidental pattern of activism 
identified by Kahan and Rock, or offensive or defensive activism in 
Armour and Cheffins' terminology.262  Though one could surmise that 
hedge funds would take a position in the target—perhaps even after the 
deal is announced, as an arbitrage—and then file suit, their infrequent 
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Id. at 646 ("When plaintiffs' lawyers cannot resolve for themselves who should be 
lead counsel, judges outside Delaware often appoint as lead or co-lead counsel the firm that 
filed first.  Consequently, since TCW Technology, filing first has probably been more valuable 
to plaintiff lawyers outside than inside Delaware.  This could create incentives for some 
lawyers—especially smaller firms, without established track records in Delaware—to race to 
file outside Delaware." (citations omitted)). 
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See discussion infra Part IV.A (discussing why public-pension funds are likely the 
institutions chosen for lead plaintiff roles). 
257
See Cain & Davidoff, supra note 104 (concluding that Delaware favors awarding 
higher attorney’s fees in strong cases over attracting many weak cases, thereby diluting its 
law). 
258
See Armour, Black & Cheffins, Losing, supra note 216, at 645. 
259
See supra Part III.B. 
260
See discussion supra notes 160-65 and accompanying text. 
261
See Krishnan et al., supra note 1, at 1248, 1253 (explaining that in mergers-and-
acquisitions litigation, the harm sought to be remedied is usually "too low a price").  
262
Armour & Cheffins, Rise and Fall, supra note 31, at 2-3; Kahan & Rock, supra 
note 141, at 1069. 
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participation in these actions reveals that this is not a strategy they 
pursue.263  In contrast, the frequent institutional lead plaintiffs are classic 
incidental or defensive activists, bringing litigation over pre-existing 
ownership stakes.264  Such activism coheres with the economic analysis 
provided by Kahan and Rock to explain why certain institutions engage 
in one type of activism or the other.265  Though not costless, transactional 
class actions are relatively inexpensive for institutional investors to 
pursue, largely because the litigation costs are borne by the plaintiffs' law 
firms.266  Moreover, hedge funds may avoid these suits because the 
expensive "learning" that is required to make most activism profitable 
may not be worth the investment here.267  The returns from such litigation 
may be too expensive and too infrequent to be worth the cost, and the 
learning that would be required is really legal learning more akin to the 
expertise of a plaintiffs' law firm than the expertise of sophisticated 
hedge fund asset managers.  It may also be the case that the hedge funds 
simply prefer to free ride off of public-pension funds and other 
institutional investors, rather than incurring their own litigation costs.  
Also, hedge funds are notoriously secretive about their trading strategies, 
and may not wish to reveal them in a deposition, as might be required of 
them when serving in the lead plaintiff capacity.268    
Thus, while not a perfect fit, the shareholder-activism literature 
suggests that obtaining a lead plaintiff role in a transactional class action 
is more akin to incidental or defensive shareholder activism, and is more 
consistent with the profit models of diversified investors like public-
pension and labor-union funds than that of hedge funds. 
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See supra Table 2 (showing a diminishing presence of "Private Non-Mutual" funds, 
which includes hedge funds, in transactional litigation). 
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See Kahan & Rock, supra note 141, at 1069. 
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See id. at 1069-70. 
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See Macey & Miller, supra note 98, at 52; cf. Kahan & Rock, supra note 141, at 
1070 (arguing that the narrowly-tailored strategy of activism is suitable for hedge funds). 
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See Kahan & Rock, supra note 141, at 1070 (stating that strategic activist mutual 
funds must learn from more experienced activists in an expensive learning phase).   
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See, e.g., Hedge Fund Trading Styles Overview, MACROPTION, 
http://www.macroption.com/hedge-fund-trading-styles-overview/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2013) 
("Hedge fund managers often keep their trading strategies secret to preserve their competitive 
advantage and the strategy's profitability."). 
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B.  Basic Statistics—Deal Characteristics 
The discussion of deal characteristics in this Section is designed to 
paint a portrait of the overall landscape of mergers-and-acquisitions class 
and derivative actions.  An appreciation of this landscape is conducive to 
understanding why certain types of institutional investors concentrate 
their efforts in one part of it or another.     
First, most of the litigation is targeted at friendly deals; 191/290 
(65%) were brought in such deals, whereas just 13/290 (4%) were 
brought in hostile deals.269  This is not surprising, since most deals are 
friendly deals.270  Of the litigated deals, 69/290 (23%) involved a 
controlling shareholder acquirer.271  These deals find themselves in the 
crosshairs of public-pension funds, as discussed more fully below in Part 
V.272  Of the litigated deals, 50/290 (17%) of litigated deals contained two 
bidders or more;273 these deals are targeted by the top plaintiff law 
firms,274 as discussed more fully below in Part V.275 
 
Table 3: Deal Characteristics276 
Deal Characteristics Number of Cases 
Controlling Shareholder 69 
LBO 42 
Friendly 191 
Hostile 13 
Second Bidder 39 
More Than 2 Bidders 11 
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See infra Table 3. 
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See infra Table 3. 
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See infra Table 3. 
272
See discussion infra Part V. 
273
See infra Table 3. 
274
See infra Table 7. 
275
See discussion infra Part V (discussing the types of deals top plaintiff law firms 
target). 
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The figures in this Table add up to more than the total number of deal cases because 
there is some overlap between the deal characteristics described.  Likewise, the percentages in 
the paragraphs discussing this Table could add up to more than 100%. 
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In terms of deal structure, 209/290 (72%) were cash-for-stock 
deals.277  It would not be surprising if this is higher than the overall 
percentage of deals that are cash for stock, at least in part because under 
Revlon, Delaware law is favorable to target plaintiff shareholders in cash 
out deals.278  In contrast, 49/290 (16%) cases were brought in stock-for-
stock deals.279   
Table 4: Deal Structure 
Structural Features Number of Cases 
Cash-for-Stock 209 
Stock for Stock 49 
Hybrid-Stock 17 
Hybrid-Cash 10 
Hybrid-Half 1 
 
Table 5 presents the most frequently litigated deal terms.280  The 
deal term that was most likely the subject of litigation was the 
termination fee (117 cases).281  The termination fee is an agreed-upon fee 
that the target company will pay the bidder if the deal is not completed.282  
The primary purpose of the termination fee is to protect the initial bidder 
who, after conducting costly due diligence and making a public bid, may 
be upstaged by free-riding competitive bidders who then bid a penny 
more.283  Without a termination fee, no bidder will want to bid first.284  A 
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See infra Table 4. 
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See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del. 
1986) ("[W]hen addressing a takeover threat, [the] principal is limited by the requirement that 
there be some rationally related benefit accruing to the stockholders."); supra note 3 and 
accompanying text. 
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See infra Table 4. 
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See infra Table 5. 
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See infra Table 5.   
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See Thomas A. Swett, Merger Terminations After Bell Atlantic: Applying a 
Liquidated Damages Analysis to Termination Fee Provisions, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 341, 355 
(1999). 
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See id. at 356 (listing protecting information and opportunity costs of first bidder as 
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See Ely R. Levy, Note, Corporate Courtship Gone Sour: Applying a Bankruptcy 
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typical termination fee should be between 3–5% of the offer.285  
Termination fees are frequently targeted by shareholder lawsuits286:  they 
amount to a penalty for shareholders exercising their lawful right to 
decline a bid, and may be coercive, particularly for deals where the 
offered premium is not much more than the termination fee.287  Yet, 
termination fees did not correlate with any particular lead plaintiff type.288  
This is probably because they are frequently litigated as a matter of 
course by all types of lead plaintiffs.289   
In a typical deal process, the target board performs a market check, 
hopefully negotiating with multiple bidders before settling upon one, and 
then consenting to a No-Shop provision that limits the board from 
shopping the company to other potential bidders.290  No-Talk provisions 
similarly limit the target board from speaking with other potential 
bidders.291  No-Shops and No-Talks were litigated in 25 and 7 cases, 
                                                                                                             
Approach to Termination Fee Provisions in Merger and Acquisition Agreements, 30 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 1361, 1371 (2002) (suggesting that, although this position is contested, termination 
fees can benefit the target because they may induce the initial bid). 
285
See Brian JM Quinn, Optionality in Merger Agreements, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 789, 
808 n.87 (2010) ("[C]ourts have approved fees in the range of 3% of transaction value and as 
large as 6% of transaction value."). 
286
See, e.g., In re IXC Commc'ns, Inc. v. Cincinnati Bell, Inc., 1999 WL 1009174 at 
*28-*29 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 1999) (addressing the plaintiff's claim that the termination fee 
contributed to the board of director's breach of fiduciary duty); cf. John C. Coates, IV, M&A 
Break Fees:  US Litigation vs. U.K. Regulation, 24, 27 (Harvard Law Sch., Harvard Public 
Law Working Paper No. 09-57, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1475354 
(suggesting that termination fees do not generate suits because litigation is significantly more 
frequent in deals without termination fees, but also positing that there is an interaction between 
termination fees and bid competition which may complicate the causal relationship of 
termination fees to litigation). 
287
See Brazen v. Bell Atl. Corp., 695 A.2d 43, 50 (Del. 1997) (indicating the 
possibility that a termination fee could be coercive, given the presence of structurally or 
situationally coercive factors).  But cf. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. McAllister, 1999 WL 1054255, 
at *2 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 1999) ("Consequently, I do not take up plaintiffs' challenge to the 
termination fee as being unduly coercive, although I think 6.3 percent certainly seems to 
stretch the definition of range of reasonableness and probably stretches the definition beyond 
its breaking point. . . . I need not reach this issue . . . ."). 
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See supra text accompanying note 175.  This determination is based on the Author's 
compilation of research from 2003 to 2009, comprising of 454 shareholder derivative and class 
action lawsuits in the Delaware Court of Chancery. 
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See infra Table 5. 
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See Guhan Subramanian, Go-Shops vs. No-Shops in Private Equity Deals:  
Evidence and Implications, 63 BUS. LAW. 729, 736 (2008) [hereinafter Subramanian, Go-
Shops]; Karl F. Balz, No-Shop Clauses, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 513, 514 (2003) (further 
explaining No-Shop provisions); cf. Go-Shops, supra, at 756-60 (discussing the characteristics 
of Go-Shop provisions that support the fulfillment of the Revlon requirement). 
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See Balz, supra note 290, at 514 (explaining the No-Talk provision). 
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respectively.292  On the other hand, Go-Shop provisions reverse the 
typical bidding process.293  A board enters into an agreement with a single 
bidder at the outset, and then, with a deal in hand, turns to the market 
with the bidder's consent to seek a better offer.294  Go-Shop provisions 
have recently emerged as a deal technology and have stirred controversy, 
with advocates arguing that they are shareholder-friendly and detractors 
suggesting that they are mere window dressing for done deals, enabling 
them to withstand Revlon scrutiny without a true bidding process.295  
Recent empirical research offers evidence that Go-Shops result in higher 
premiums for shareholders, except in management buyouts, suggesting 
that it is usually appropriate for Go-Shops to be viewed as satisfying a 
board's Revlon duties.296  Go-Shops were litigated in 13 cases.297  As will 
be discussed below in Part V.A, Go-Shop provisions negatively correlate 
with institutional lead plaintiffs.298 
 
Table 5: Deal Terms 
Deal Terms Number of Case 
Termination Fee 117 
No Shop 25 
No Talk 7 
Go Shop 13 
 
I also examined the target's listing exchange.  The vast majority of 
target companies were listed on either NASDAQ or NYSE, with slightly 
more companies listed on NASDAQ (133) than NYSE (115).299  It is 
 
                                                                                                             
292
See infra Table 5. 
293
See Subramanian, Go-Shops, supra note 290, at 735. 
294
See id. at 730 (describing the Go-Shop process). 
295
See id. at 739-40 (comparing the view that a Go-Shop provision can only improve a 
seller's position because it allows subsequent higher bids to be considered with the view that 
no real post-deal shopping happens, but the provision allows the buyer to curtail pre-deal 
shopping). 
296
See id. at 751-52, 760 (finding that pure Go-Shop deals achieve approximately 5% 
higher abnormal returns for target shareholders than No-Shop deals). 
297
See infra Table 5. 
298
See infra Part V.A.; supra Table 1. 
299
See infra Table 6. 
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tempting to state that this follows a well-known pattern of litigation more 
frequently targeting technology companies, who dominate NASDAQ and 
tend towards greater share-price volatility.300  This argument has been 
used to explain why such companies are more likely to be targeted by a 
securities fraud class action.301  More volatile companies are more likely 
to incur the sharp drop in price that is associated with a shareholder 
suit.302  Similarly, volatility might explain the suits here, to the extent that 
deal litigation and deal price are affected by the 52-week high.303 
 
Table 6: Target Listing 
Exchanges Number of Target Companies 
Listed 
NYSE 115 
NASDAQ 133 
Other 32 
 
Finally, I examined plaintiff-law-firm participation.  Below, Table 
7 identifies the most frequent law-firm participants.304  Some of these 
firms are significant players in securities fraud class actions, and some 
are not.305  The legal issues and the economics of transactional and 
 
                                                                                                             
300
See Ken Little, What Market Indexes Tell Us[:]   The Dow and                           
Other Market Indexes Explained,   ABOUT.COM, 
http://stocks.about.com/od/understandingstocks/a/Indexes102704.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 
2013) ("Nasdaq is heavily weighted to technology stocks."); Education:  Aggressive Growth 
Investing, ZACKS INV. RESEARCH, http://www.zacks.com/education/articles.php?id=58 (last 
visited Sept. 14, 2013) (explaining that many technology companies on the NASDAQ have 
high beta ratings which denote volatility). 
301
D&O and Securities Litigation:  Recent Trends in Federal Securities            
Litigation, GORDON & REES LLP (Feb. 2007) 
http://www.gordonrees.com/publications/viewPublication.cfm?contentID=343 (indicating that 
a strong market and low stock volatility reduces the number of lawsuits filed). 
302
See Baruch Lev, How to Win Investors Over, 89 HARVARD BUS. REVIEW 54, 54-55 
(Nov. 2011) (arguing that lowering volatility reduces the likelihood of a shareholder lawsuit). 
303
See Malcolm Baker, Xin Pan & Jeffrey Wurgler, The Effect of Reference Point 
Prices on Mergers and Acquisitions, 106 J. FIN. ECON. 49, 50-51 (Oct. 2012) (finding that 
offer prices are biased towards the 52-week high).  
304
See infra Table 7. 
305
See Choi, Motions, supra note 208, at app.D (listing frequent lead counsel in 
securities class actions). 
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securities class actions differ substantially from one another, as discussed 
earlier in Part III.A,306 which might lead one to think that different 
universes of law firms would litigate the two types of cases.  On the 
other hand, two key factors enable the same plaintiff law firms to operate 
in both fields of litigation:  (1) both involve representation of a class of 
shareholders for a contingency fee;307 and (2) both lend themselves to 
portfolio monitoring relationships with institutional-investor clients 
because such clients are favored class representatives in both types of 
cases.308  As for the first point, these firms already operate on a business 
model that requires them to finance litigation for extended periods of 
time on their own, rather than through the collection of monthly billings 
from clients who pay by the hour.309  Unlike traditional law firms, these 
firms need not create a new business model to move from one field of 
litigation to another.310  And as for the second point, firms that engage in 
portfolio monitoring have ready access to the clients and the information 
that they need to realistically pursue lead counsel appointments in either 
transactional or securities fraud class actions.311  Still, it is noteworthy 
that many of the firms that do participate in both forms of litigation 
designate different attorneys and sometimes different practice groups to 
focus on each litigation specialty.312   
I offer additional analysis of law firms and case characteristics in 
Part V.A. below.313 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
306
See discussion supra Part III.A. 
307
See 4B MICHAEL J. CHEPIGA & PAUL C. CURNIN, COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN 
NEW YORK STATE COURTS § 80:10 (3d ed. updated 2012). 
308
See Rubenstein, supra note 191, at 219 (discussing how the monitoring of 
investments by plaintiffs firms leads to the retention of that firm as lead plaintiff in most 
cases). 
309
See Paula Batt Wilson, Attorney Investment in Class Action Litigation:  The Agent 
Orange Example, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 291, 311-13 (1994) (describing the complex 
financing contracts entered into by the class action plaintiffs' attorneys). 
310
See id. at 291. 
311
See discussion supra Part III.A (noting that law firms who engage in portfolio 
monitoring have access to information such as client investments). 
312
E.g., Our People, CHIMICLES & TIKELLIS, LLP, http://www.chimicles.com/our-
people (last visited Sept. 14, 2013) (illustrating that some firms may designate attorneys to 
work exclusively on transactional class actions, rather than securities fraud class actions). 
313
See discussion supra Part V.A. 
2014] PRIVATE POLICING OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 47 
 
Table 7:  Most Frequent Plaintiff Law Firm Participant314 
Plaintiff Law Firm Number of 
Appearances 
 
Rosenthal, Monhait & Goddess, P.A.* 129 
Chimicles & Tikellis, LLP** 60 
Rigordsky & Long, P.A.* 52 
Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach, 
LLP 
31 
The Brualdi Law Firm, P.C. 29 
Wolf Popper LLP 24 
Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP** 23 
The Weiser Law Firm, P.C. 21 
Schiffrin & Barroway, LLP  20 
Prickett, Jones & Elliott, P.A.* 19 
Bernstein Liebhard & Lifshitz, LLP 18 
Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz, LLP 17 
Goodkind Labaton Ruddoff & Sucharow, 
LLP** 
15 
Lerach Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & 
Robbins, LLP 
14 
Bull & Lifshitz, LLP 12 
Glancy Binkow & Goldberg, LLP 11 
Gardy & Notis, LLP 10 
Wechsler, Harwood Halebian & Feffer, LLP 10 
*Headquartered in Delaware.  **Office in Delaware. 
 
                                                                                                             
314
An earlier version of this table, based on the data collected for this Article, was 
published by Brian Cheffins, John Armour, and Bernard Black.  Brian Cheffins, John Armour 
& Bernard Black, Delaware Corporate Litigation and the Fragmentation of the Plaintiffs' 
Bar, 2 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 427, 473-74 (2012) (illustrating an earlier version of Table 7).  
The reason for the slight discrepancy between the data presented in this table and the data 
published in the aforementioned article is that this table includes appearances by firms in 
earlier incarnations under slightly different names. 
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V.  THE CASE CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH INSTITUTIONAL 
LEAD PLAINTIFFS   
In this Section, I examine what case characteristics are associated 
with institutional lead plaintiffs, and with particular types of institutional 
lead plaintiffs, focusing on public-pension funds, labor-union funds, and 
private non-mutual funds.  This discussion will not involve mutual funds 
and hedge funds, which rarely participate in these suits.315     
But before doing so, I offer a brief explanation of why I exclude 
cases following the bankruptcy filing of Lehman Brothers on September 
15, 2008.316  This event is typically viewed as the trigger of the profound 
financial crisis of 2008.317  It wreaked tremendous economic havoc which 
manifested itself in mergers-and-acquisitions litigation as it did almost 
everywhere else.318  A comprehensive assessment of how this event 
affected mergers-and-acquisitions litigation is beyond the scope of this 
Article.  However, I note that in unpublished statistical tests, I find 
substantial differences before and after the bankruptcy filing of Lehman 
Brothers in key case characteristics, such as the size of the premium in 
litigated deals.  Deal premiums over which investors might have been 
ecstatic pre-Lehman became subject to suit post-Lehman.319  Moreover, 
as discussed in Part IV above, all institutions began litigating more deals 
post-Lehman.320  Because the focus of this Article is an assessment of 
transactional litigation in "normal times," and not in the midst of a 
financial panic, I set aside post-Lehman Brothers cases in assessing the 
data on case characteristics and case outcomes associated with 
institutional-investor lead plaintiffs. 
 
                                                                                                             
315
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 141, at 1042-43 (explaining that hedge funds and 
mutual funds represent a passive form of activism). 
316
See In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., No. 1:08-BK-13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
filed Sept. 15, 2008). 
317
See, e.g., JOSEPH TIBMAN, THE MURDER OF LEHMAN BROTHERS: AN INSIDER'S 
LOOK AT THE GLOBAL MELTDOWN 7 (2009); MARK T. WILLIAMS, UNCONTROLLED RISK: 
THE LESSONS OF LEHMAN BROTHERS AND HOW SYSTEMIC RISK CAN STILL BRING DOWN 
THE WORLD FINANCIAL SYSTEM 1 (2010). 
318
See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERSLLP, supra note 55, at 5 (describing the increase 
in mergers-and-acquisitions litigation as a percentage of transactions after 2008). 
319
Id. 
320
See supra text accompanying note 202; Table 2. 
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A.  Institutional-Investor Lead Plaintiffs in the Aggregate 
In my first cut at the data, I examine institutional investors in the 
aggregate.321  What cases are they attracted to?  What cases do they 
avoid?  
 
Table 8: Determinants of an Institutional Lead Plaintiff 
 Model One Model Two Model Three 
Complaint 
Length 
0.05813 
(0.001)*** 
  
Complaints 
 
0.443691 
(0.000)*** 
0.421172 
(0.001)*** 
Premium < 
20% 
0.71658 
(0.034)** 
0.720147 
(0.036)** 
0.729398 
(0.034)** 
Go-Shop -1.60346 
(0.033)** 
-1.40027 
(0.066)* 
-1.34263 
(0.075)* 
Target 
MCAP 
0.121455 
(0.175) 
0.19444 
(0.036)** 
0.20778 
(0.028)** 
Cash/Stock 0.730229 
(0.094)* 
0.924989 
(0.045)** 
0.921716 
(0.046)** 
Control SHH   0.348724 
(0.387) 
P-Value 
 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
Binary logistic regressions with dummy-dependent variable for 
institutional lead plaintiff.  This data is Pre-Lehman.  *** = 1% 
confidence, ** = 5% confidence, * = 10% confidence. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
321
See infra Table 8. 
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First, complaint length correlates with institutional lead 
plaintiffs.322  To place this variable in context, I note that the baseline 
complaints in these cases are often short.323  I would describe some of 
them as "control-find-replace" complaints, in which the only details 
altered by the law firm from case-to-case are the names of the 
plaintiffs.324  These complaints contain broad allegations of misconduct 
and generic pleas to increase disclosure, open up the bidding process, 
and raise the offer price.325  In contrast, institutional lead plaintiffs 
correlate with longer complaints that reflect a substantial review of the 
case details, identifying specific problems with the transaction and 
enumerating its legal flaws.326  The complaint length reflects this deeper 
investigation of the case made by the institutions and the law firms that 
they select to represent them.327  Complaint length may also reflect a 
competitive environment for lead plaintiff selection.  Delaware courts 
consider the quality of the complaint in lead plaintiff selection.328  
Complaint length may roughly proxy for complaint quality; institutions 
in a competitive situation (and their lawyers) likely write longer 
complaints when competing for the lead plaintiff role.      
 
                                                                                                             
322
See supra Table 8. 
323
Mean complaint length is 19 pages, maximum is 68 pages, and a minimum is 6 
pages.  See supra Table 8. 
324
In some cases, the plaintiff's gender may not even be identified correctly.  See 
discussion infra pp. 58-59 (discussing "cut and paste" complaints). 
325
See, e.g., Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 364 (Del. 
2006) (affirming Delaware Court of Chancery decision to dismiss shareholder derivative 
action with non-institutional plaintiff for failure to plead with sufficient specificity). 
326
See, e.g., In re Citigroup Inc. Derivative S'holder Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 114-15 (Del. 
Ch. 2009) (institutional lead plaintiff's complaint was eighty-six pages long); TCW Tech. 
P'ship v. Intermedia Commc'ns, Inc., 2000 WL 1654504, at *4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 2000) 
(appointing institutional plaintiffs lead plaintiffs because their pleadings covered the claims 
being made by smaller shareholders and because of the enthusiasm with which they have 
litigated). 
327
Interestingly, as noted below in Table 13, the most frequent law firm participants in 
these cases (excluding local counsel) correlate with shorter complaints, except when they serve 
institutional-investor lead plaintiffs, in which case they correlate with longer complaints.  See 
infra Table 13.  This suggests either that institutional investors demand more work from these 
firms, that firms work harder when litigating cases associated with institutions, or that the 
institutions use firms other than the most frequent players.   
328
See, e.g., Hirt v. U.S. Timberlands Serv. Co., 2002 WL 1558342, at *2 (Del. Ch. 
July 3, 2002) (recognizing that the "quality of the pleading" is an important factor to consider 
when deciding who to designate as lead plaintiff). 
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Not surprisingly, the number of complaints correlates with 
institutional lead plaintiffs.329  It may be that the number of complaints 
proxies for case quality, with more complaints correlating with poor deal 
terms and unhappy investors bringing suit independently of one 
another.330  The correlation between the number of complaints and 
institutional investor lead plaintiffs may also be an example of herding 
behavior, with one institution's involvement attracting the attention of 
others.331  In particularly large, high-profile cases, institutions may 
compete to assume the lead role.332  Then again, institutions might also 
prefer to free ride off of the lead-plaintiff efforts of other institutions, 
which would run counter to the institutional-herding explanation.333  
Another version of the herding explanation is that the number of 
complaints may also reflect interest by plaintiff law firms representing 
small clients.  These law firms may file suit where they observe or 
anticipate that institutional investors will also file suit.  The firms hope 
that the institutions' counsel, upon winning the lead counsel role, will 
offer them some work on the case in exchange for a small percentage of 
the legal fee.  Like jackals hovering around the lion's kill, these firms 
know that the cost of chasing them away may be greater than the cost of 
letting them eat scraps.  For example, one cost that the small firms can 
impose on the larger players is to object to the settlement at the court 
hearing.334  Even lions prefer well-fed jackals to hungry ones.     
The offer premium is the percentage difference between the offer 
price and the target's pre-offer trading price.335  One might expect that 
 
                                                                                                             
329
See supra Table 8. 
330
See Jessica Erickson, Corporate Governance in the Courtroom: An Empirical 
Analysis, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1749, 1768 (2010) ("[I]nstitutional investors in derivative 
suits are drawn to the bigger, higher-quality cases."). 
331
John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control:  The Institutional Investor As 
Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1310 (1991) ("Institutional investors often share 
the same views and thus trade in a herd-like manner."). 
332
Note that the market capitalization of the target is significant in Models Two and 
Three, suggesting that institutions bring suit in larger cases.  See supra Table 8. 
333
See Coffee, supra note 331, at 1285-86 n.23 (discussing the "free rider" problem). 
334
See Edward Brunet, Class Action Objectors: Extortionist Free Riders or Fairness 
Guarantors, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 403, 436-38 (2003) (discussing objection "blackmail" 
where an objector's attorney seeks only to maximize his fee); Bruce D. Greenberg, Keeping 
the Flies out of the Ointment:  Restricting Objectors to Class Action Settlements, 84 ST. 
JOHN'S L. REV. 949, 961-64 (2010) (discussing tactics objector counsels use in order to 
increase their fees, especially in larger litigations). 
335
See, e.g., Dale A. Oesterle, Target Managers as Negotiating Agents for Target 
Shareholders in Tender Offers:  A Reply to the Passivity Thesis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 53, 60-
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offer premium alone would negatively correlate with institutional 
investor lead plaintiff appointments.  One view of mergers-and-
acquisitions litigation is that low-deal premiums motivate shareholder 
suits; shareholders ultimately care about price, and might remain quite 
content with coercive deal terms if they are well-compensated for it.336  
Therefore, one would expect that the size of the premium would 
negatively correlate with institutional lead plaintiffs.  Yet, premium 
alone was not significant in any regression model.337   
In Table 8, I further subdivide the premium data using a dummy 
variable for deals whose initial offers constitute a less-than-20% 
premium.338  The 20% threshold is frequently used in practice as a "rule 
of thumb" for whether a deal's terms are fair for shareholders; deals with 
20%+ premiums may be difficult to challenge, whereas deals below the 
threshold are more vulnerable.339  Here, the results are significant at the 
5% confidence level.340  Deals with a less-than-20% offer premium 
positively correlate with institutional lead plaintiffs, as expected.341  Half 
of all cases with less-than-20% offer premiums are led by institutions 
(56/113).342  In contrast, institutions lead just 32% of more-than-20% 
offer-premium deals (36/111).343 
Go-Shop provisions negatively, and statistically significantly, 
correlate with institutional lead plaintiffs, at the 5% confidence level in 
Model One, and at 10% confidence in Models Two and Three.344  Go-
Shop provisions encourage the target board to shop the company to other 
potential higher bidders, usually within some specified time frame.345  
The presence of such a provision may persuade potential institutional 
lead plaintiffs not to bring suit.  It may indicate that the target board has 
complied with Revlon by taking the appropriate steps to obtain the 
                                                                                                             
61 (1985-86) (discussing the functioning of an offer premium). 
336
See Webber, Plight, supra note 18, at 204 (a central component of mergers-and-
acquisitions complaints is that the offer price is too low). 
337
See supra Table 8. 
338
See supra Table 8. 
339
Aaron Yoran (Jurkevitz), Advance Defensive Tactics Against Takeover Bids, 21 
AM. J. COMP. L. 531, 531 n.1 (1973) ("[In the United States,] a 20% premium [is] a common 
rule of thumb."). 
340
See supra Table 8. 
341
See supra Table 8. 
342
See supra Table 8. 
343
See supra Table 8. 
344
See supra Table 8. 
345
See Subramanian, Go-Shops, supra note 290, at 730 (defining Go-Shop provisions). 
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highest price for shareholders.346  Alternatively, a Go-Shop provision may 
simply be an indicator of an attractive deal for shareholders.347  Its 
presence may be a measure of the target and the bidder's confidence in 
the quality of the deal.  It may not be doing any work itself to fend off a 
potential lawsuit, but may simply indicate that a deal is attractive enough 
that it is highly likely that no lawsuit is forthcoming, at least not one 
from a sophisticated institutional lead plaintiff.  A less sanguine view of 
the negative correlation between the presence of Go-Shops and 
institutional lead plaintiffs is not that Go-Shops reflect the attractiveness 
of the deal, but that they deter other bidders from trying to outbid the 
target board's current choice of acquirer, or pay the accompanying 
termination fee.348  Institutions may avoid suit where they fear a 
diminished probability of a second bidder, and consequently, a lower 
likelihood of share-price appreciation.  Still, prior research suggests that 
this cynical view of Go-Shops is misplaced, at least outside of the MBO 
context.349   
In Models Two and Three, the market capitalization of the target 
positively correlates with institutional lead plaintiffs.350  This supports the 
contention that institutional investors target larger deals.351  They may do 
so both because they have more at stake in these deals and because they 
prefer to litigate high-profile transactions that may attract favorable 
attention for institutions serving as shareholder advocates.  Still, it should 
be noted that target-market capitalization alone does not predict 
institutional-investor lead plaintiffs, and is not even statistically 
significant in all models.352 
Cash-for-stock deals also positively correlate with institutional 
lead plaintiffs.353  Most deals are cash-for-stock deals.354  But the fact that 
 
                                                                                                             
346
See id. at 731 ("[G]o-[S]hop provisions, appropriately structured, can satisfy a target 
board's Revlon duties."). 
347
See Phillip Mills & Mutya Harsch, How to Avoid the Jump, 25 INT'L FIN. L. REV. 
44, 45 (2006) (discussing the attractive features of a Go-Shop provision). 
348
See Subramanian, Go-Shops, supra note 290, at 736 ("[T]he combination of the fee 
and the first bidder's match right may deter a prospective bidder.").  
349
See id. ("[Outside the MBO context,] [o]n average, go shops yield more aggregate 
search, significant post-signing competition, and slightly higher returns to target shareholders 
than traditional no-shop deals."). 
350
See supra Table 8. 
351
See Erickson, supra note 330, at 1768 ("[I]nstitutional investors in derivative suits 
are drawn to the bigger, higher-quality cases."). 
352
See supra Table 8. 
353
See supra Table 8. 
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cash-for-stock deals are particularly targeted by institutional investors 
requires explanation.  One possible cause is Revlon.355  Revlon creates a 
favorable legal regime for plaintiff shareholders, because in cash-out 
mergers directors face enhanced scrutiny and a duty to maximize the 
share price.356  In contrast, the legal regime in stock-for-stock deals is 
more complex.357  Delaware courts have taken the view that shareholders 
in stock-for-stock transactions are more insulated from abuse than 
shareholders in cash-out mergers, in part because they maintain an 
ongoing stake in the enterprise.358  Plaintiff shareholders may therefore be 
more inclined to bring litigation under a Revlon regime, both because 
they are more susceptible to exploitation in cash-for-stock deals, and 
because the law makes it more likely that they can obtain a favorable 
outcome from the litigation.359  Yet, it is also worth noting that Thomas 
and Thompson find no improvement in outcomes in Revlon cases versus 
other cases.360  Institutions may merely be acting on the perception that 
they will do better in Revlon cases. 
Finally, I note that in Model Three, controlling-shareholder 
transactions do not significantly correlate with institutional lead 
plaintiffs.361  I highlight this result because it is a principal distinction 
between cases brought by institutions overall and cases brought by the 
most active and successful institutional lead plaintiffs—public-pension 
funds.  Public-pension funds target controlling-shareholder deals in their 
lawsuits.362  Minority shareholders are at their most vulnerable in such 
transactions.363  I discuss this point further in the next Section.364        
                                                                                                             
354
See Elliott J. Weiss, Balancing Interests in Cash-Out Mergers: The Promise of 
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 8 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 2 n.4 (1983) (noting that cash-out mergers are 
the most common type of mergers).  
355
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 
1986). 
356
Id. at 182, 184 (holding that directors who sell in cash-out mergers have a duty to 
get the best price for stockholders rather than to protect the corporate assets). 
357
See generally Arnold v. Soc'y of Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270 (Del. 1994) 
(illustrating the complexities of the legal regime in stock-for-stock deals). 
358
See id. at 1289-90. 
359
See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182, 184 (holding that the director's role is to get the best 
price for the stockholders at a sale of the company, making plaintiffs less susceptible to 
exploitation and increasing the likelihood of a favorable outcome from litigation). 
360
See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 195-96 (noting Revlon's slight effect on 
shareholder litigation outcomes).   
361
See supra Table 8 (noting that of the cases with institutional lead plaintiffs only 
.348724 are controlling-shareholder transactions). 
362
See infra Table 9. 
363
Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 
87 YALE L.J. 1354, 1357 (1978) (stating that controlling-shareholder transactions are coercive 
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B.  Case Selection Variables by Institutional Type 
1.  Public-Pension Funds and the Targeting of Controlling-Shareholder 
Transactions 
The most notable difference between transactions targeted by 
institutional lead plaintiffs generally and those targeted by public-
pension funds is that the latter are much more likely to target controlling-
shareholder transactions.365  As noted in Table 10 below, the presence of 
a controlling shareholder is a statistically significant predictor of a 
public-pension lead plaintiff.366  The likelihood of a public-pension lead 
plaintiff increases dramatically in the presence of a controlling 
shareholder.367  There are a number of reasons why this might be the case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
of minority stockholders because the majority can require the minority to accept terms through 
majority rule). 
364
See infra Part V.B.i. (examining why minority shareholders are most vulnerable to 
exploitation by an acquirer in a controlling shareholder transaction). 
365
See supra Table 8 (noting that in Model Three, institutional lead plaintiff cases with 
controlling shareholders was .348724); infra Table 9 (noting that in Model Three, public-
pension lead plaintiffs with controlling shareholders was 1.48324). 
366
See infra Table 10. 
367
See infra Table 9. 
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Table 9: Indicators of Public-Pension Lead Plaintiff 
 Model One Model Two Model Three 
Complaint 
Length 
0.069676 
(0.001)*** 
0.062668 
(0.004)*** 
0.06913 
(0.001)*** 
Hostile 1.31811 
(0.168) 
 1.33169 
(0.192) 
Target Market 
Cap 
0.748832 
(0.000)*** 
0.697917 
(0.000)*** 
0.759752 
(0.000)*** 
Controlling 
Shareholder 
1.52773 
(0.015)** 
1.12596 
(0.098)* 
1.48324 
(0.021)** 
Cash-for-Stock 0.337657 
(0.642) 
 0.441603 
(0.554) 
# Lead 
Plaintiffs 
 0.128425 
(0.077)*  
Premium   -0.28704 
(0.869) 
Go-Shop   -0.757747 
(0.522) 
 
Binary logistic regressions with dependent-dummy variable for the 
presence of a public-pension fund lead plaintiff, including Pre-Lehman 
deal cases only.  The premium, complaints, and Go-Shop variables were 
dropped from Models One and Two in this regression for lack of 
significance.  *** = 1% confidence, ** = 5% confidence, * = 10% 
confidence. 
 
First, minority shareholders are most vulnerable to exploitation by 
the acquirer in a controlling-shareholder transaction.368  In the typical 
acquisition, the acquirer is a third party.369  But in a controlling-
shareholder transaction, the acquirer is an insider.370  Controlling 
shareholders play a substantial role in influencing the composition of the 
target's board of directors, thereby undermining the board's ability to 
 
                                                                                                             
368
See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 363, at 1357. 
369
See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176, 
178 (Del. 1986) (illustrating a normal acquisition where both possible acquirers were third 
parties). 
370
See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1113, 1115 (Del. 
1994) (illustrating a controlling-shareholder transaction where the acquirer is an insider). 
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independently assess price and deal terms.371  Controlling shareholders 
also have access to inside information.372  Such access can give a 
controlling shareholder the ability to favorably time its acquisition to 
squeeze out the minority shareholders, depriving them of the full benefit 
of their investments.373  For example, a controlling shareholder in a 
pharmaceutical company might attempt an acquisition prior to 
publication of clinical studies demonstrating the likely success of a drug 
in the company's research and development pipeline.  For these reasons, 
Delaware courts have instituted additional legal protections for minority 
shareholders in controlling-shareholder transactions.374 
This combination of the strong potential for exploitation of 
minority investors,375 and the attendant legal protections designed to 
thwart such exploitation,376 may attract public-pension lead plaintiffs.  
Such plaintiffs may be more inclined to participate in cases where they 
are particularly vulnerable to exploitation; they may be further attracted 
to such cases when the legal protections in place increase the likelihood 
that their leadership of a lawsuit will result in tangible benefits.  It may 
also be the case that any investor would happily lead such cases, but that 
public-pension funds are well-positioned to seize the leadership role 
because they are the largest institutional players (at least among 
institutions willing to participate in such litigation), have the most at 
stake, and therefore are favored for the lead plaintiff role under the Hirt 
factors outlined above.377  Below, I will revisit this question of whether 
public-pension funds are the best litigators, or whether they just cherry-
pick the best cases.378 
 
                                                                                                             
371
Guhan Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115 YALE L.J. 2, 9-10 (2005) (discussing 
lack of independent assessment by target's board where acquirer controls selection of target's 
board). 
372
Id. at 32 (noting that controlling shareholders have access to inside information and 
could take advantage of nonpublic information).   
373
Id. (stating that inside information gives controlling acquirers the ability to freeze 
out the minority at a more favorable time).   
374
See supra Part III.B (discussing additional protections for minority shareholders in 
controlling-shareholder transactions).    
375
See supra note 363 and accompanying text. 
376
See supra Part III.B. 
377
See Hirt v. U.S. Timberlands Serv. Co., 2002 WL 1558342, at *2 (Del. Ch. June 9, 
2002); see also supra text accompanying notes 53-54 (outlining the Hirt factors). 
378
See infra Part VI.A. 
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As with institutions generally, target-market capitalization is a 
significant predictor of a public-pension lead plaintiff.379  But this factor 
correlates much more strongly with public-pension lead plaintiffs than it 
does with institutions generally.380  The coefficients for the target-market 
capitalization variable are more than three times larger for public-
pension funds than for institutions generally.381  Moreover, the results 
increase in statistical significance from 5% confidence for institutions 
generally to 1% confidence for public-pension funds.382  In further 
analyzing the correlation between market capitalization and public-
pension lead plaintiffs, I subdivided the targets by market capitalization 
into quartiles, from 0–25th, 25th–50th, 50th–75th, and 75th–100th 
percentiles.383  The simple regression below in Table 9A illustrates the 
probability of suit by a public-pension-fund lead plaintiff by target 
market capitalization: 
 
Table 9A: Public-Pension Lead Plaintiffs By Target-Market 
Capitalization 
 
Target Market Capitalization By 
Quartile 
Model One 
Target MCAP 25th–50th 
Percentile 
-0.9097 
(0.942) 
Target MCAP 50th–75th 
Percentile 
1.6335 
(0.058)* 
Target MCAP 75th–100th 
Percentile 
2.8368 
(0.000)*** 
 
 Thus, public-pension funds obtain lead plaintiff appointments in 
large-deal cases in which they also have a high stake.384  It is clear that 
 
                                                                                                             
379
See supra Table 9 (showing a correlation between public-pension lead plaintiffs and 
target market capitalization). 
380
Compare supra Table 8 (showing data for institutions generally), with supra Table 
9 (showing data for public-pension lead plaintiffs). 
381
Compare supra Table 8 (coefficient range of 0.12 to 0.2 for institutions), with supra 
Table 9 (coefficient range of 0.7 to 0.75 for public-pensions). 
382
Compare supra Table 8 (institutions), with supra Table 9 (public-pensions). 
383
See infra Table 9A (showing data for public-pension lead plaintiffs by target-market 
capitalization). 
384
See supra Table 9A. 
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public-pension funds save their litigation ammunition for the largest 
targets, though size alone is not the only factor.385 
Like institutions generally, the length of the complaint also 
increases the probability of involvement by a public-pension lead 
plaintiff.386  Public-pension funds write complaints that are nearly twice 
as long as the overall sample; the median (mean) complaint length for 
public-pension funds is 29 (29) pages, compared to a median (mean) of 
15.5 (17.9) pages for cases overall.  The length of the complaint is 
utilized here as a proxy for attorney and lead plaintiff effort.387  As noted 
earlier, complaint length is probative of lead plaintiff and lead counsel 
effort.388  Shorter, "cookie cutter" complaints with "cut and paste" lead 
plaintiffs and claims tend to be written by law firms representing 
individual lead plaintiffs who stand little chance of obtaining an 
appointment.389  Such lead plaintiffs, and more likely, their counsel, have 
probably filed suit in the hope that no one else will, or that the 
ultimately-appointed lead plaintiff will give the attorneys who filed the 
short complaint some work on the case and a small share of the fee.390  
Winning lead counsel may choose to do so in the hope that these 
attorneys will not direct their individual clients to object to the 
settlement.391  In contrast, longer complaints tend to be written by lead 
counsel representing institutional investors who have a realistic chance 
of winning the appointment.392  As noted above, Delaware courts 
consider the quality of the complaint in making this selection.393   
 
                                                                                                             
385
See supra Table 9A. 
386
Compare supra Table 8 (illustrating how the length of the complaint correlates with 
an institutional lead plaintiff), with supra Table 9 (illustrating how the length of the complaint 
correlates with involvement of a public-pension lead plaintiff). 
387
See supra notes 326-28 and accompanying text (describing possible reasons why 
complaint length is correlated with involvement by institutional lead plaintiffs and higher 
quality complaints).  
388
See supra notes 326-27 and accompanying text. 
389
See supra notes 324-25 and accompanying text. 
390
Choi et al., Do Institutions Matter?, supra note 117, at 873; Charles Silver & Sam 
Dinkin, Incentivizing Institutional Investors to Serve as Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Fraud 
Class Actions, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 471, 478 (2008). 
391
See Silver & Dinkin, supra note 390, at 478. 
392
See supra notes 326-27 and accompanying text. 
393
See TCW Tech. P'ship v. Intermedia Commc'ns, Inc., 2000 WL 1654504 at *4 (Del. 
Ch. Oct. 17, 2000) (stating that the plaintiff that has the greatest economic stake in the 
outcome should be chosen to represent the class); supra note 328 and accompanying text. 
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Unlike institutional investors generally, the offer premium plays 
little or no role in public-pension-fund case selection.394  This result is 
particularly intriguing given that the involvement of public-pension 
funds alone correlate with an increase in offer price, as discussed 
below.395  Moreover, public-pension lead plaintiffs do not correlate with 
cash-for-stock deals.396   
I conclude this Section with some final observations about public-
pension lead plaintiffs.  First, unlike institutional investors generally, 
participation of public-pension funds does not correlate with the number 
of complaints.397  I find some weak evidence that they correlate with the 
number of lead plaintiffs, as evidenced in Table 9 above.398  I note that 
this result is not particularly robust.  There are a few possible 
explanations for why public-pension funds might correlate with the 
number of lead plaintiffs, rather than with the number of complaints.  
First, public-pension funds may be more likely to file for the lead 
plaintiff role in pre-arranged groups of two or more, rather than 
individually.399  Stephen Choi finds some evidence for this kind of 
coalition building by public-pension funds in securities fraud class 
actions.400  In competitive lead plaintiff situations, institutions eager to 
assume the lead plaintiff role, and the law firms that represent them, are 
incentivized to form such groups.401  They may aggregate their stakes in 
the target to increase their probability of being selected as lead 
plaintiffs.402  Such voluntary aggregation into lead plaintiff groups prior 
to filing a complaint or moving for lead plaintiff appointment may 
explain why the number of lead plaintiffs correlates with public-pension 
participation and why the number of complaints does not.  Such 
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Compare supra Table 8 ("Premium < 20%"), with infra Table 12 ("Premium"). 
395
See infra Table 12.  
396
See supra Table 9. 
397
Compare supra Table 8, with supra Table 9. 
398
See supra Table 9. 
399
See Choi, Motions, supra note 208, at 211-12. 
400
See id. (suggesting that the presence of multiple lead counsel in an initial lead 
plaintiff motion in 21.2% of the sample indicates the formation of a plaintiff group before the 
lead plaintiff appointment). 
401
See id.; see also Silver & Dinkin, supra note 390, at 477-78 (discussing the 
incentives for investors to occupy the lead plaintiff position and why public-pension funds in 
particular are more eager to assume the lead plaintiff role). 
402
See Choi, Motions, supra note 208, at 211-12; Cox et al., supra note 118, at 366 
("There is a continuing practice of permitting groups of individuals to aggregate their claims, 
particularly when they share a pre-existing relationship."). 
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aggregation may be facilitated by portfolio monitoring, discussed 
earlier.403  Law firms that engage in portfolio monitoring may be able to 
identify multiple public-pension clients and offer to aggregate their 
stakes for purposes of applying for the lead plaintiff role.404  Another, 
related, explanation might be that public-pension funds, and their 
attorneys, may prefer not to litigate the lead plaintiff issue, instead opting 
for a "big tent" strategy comprised of larger lead plaintiff groups.405  But 
if this were the case, one might still expect to see more complaints, 
followed by aggregation.  Finally, smaller players may be less inclined to 
file complaints in cases in which public-pension funds have, thinking 
that they have little hope of obtaining any lead plaintiff or lead counsel 
role against such competition.406  Perhaps public-pension funds are less 
susceptible to threats from smaller players objecting to settlement, given 
their frequent participation in such suits, their experienced counsel, and 
their comparative success in the lead plaintiff role, as discussed more 
fully below.407 
It is commonly known that public-pension funds actively engage 
in corporate-governance-reform efforts.408  I hypothesized that corporate-
governance issues could constitute a factor in their case selection.  
Accordingly, I used the Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell Entrenchment Index 
("E-Index") to determine if board-entrenchment measures could attract 
(or repel) public-pension lead plaintiffs, but the results were not 
significant, nor were they significant for other institutions or for 
institutions generally. 
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See supra note 311 and accompanying text. 
404
See Webber, Plight, supra note 18, at 167. 
405
See Webber, Pay-to-Play, supra note 18, at 2051-52 (stating that large public-
pension funds with losses large enough to qualify them for a lead plaintiff appointment 
frequently forgo the opportunity to be appointed lead plaintiff). 
406
See Webber, Plight, supra note 18, at 180 (recognizing the possibility that 
sophisticated individual investors may like to obtain lead plaintiff appointments, but have no 
chance to obtain a leadership role under the current system that favors institutional lead 
plaintiffs). 
407
See infra notes 429-38 and accompanying text. 
408
See Webber, Plight, supra note 18, at 199-200 (discussing the participation of 
public-pension funds in corporate-governance reform). 
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2.  Labor-Union Funds, Mutual Funds, and Private Non-Mutual Funds 
Table 10: Indicators of Labor-Union Lead Plaintiff 
 Model One Model Two Model Three 
# Complaints 0.302665 
(0.001)*** 
0.297939 
(0.002)*** 
0.292741 
(0.002)*** 
targetMCAP 0.415387 
(0.024)** 
0.407735 
(0.028)** 
0.408012 
(0.028)** 
Cash-for-Stock 2.6752 
(0.074)* 
2.66328 
(0.09)* 
2.79401 
(0.089)* 
Duty of Faith  2.86035 
(0.038)** 
2.91036 
(0.036)** 
Duty of 
Loyalty 
 -2.73203 
(0.044)** 
-2.72851 
(0.044)** 
Derivative   0.773596 
(0.639) 
Binary logistic regression with dependent variable dummy for labor-
union fund.  This data is Pre-Lehman and P-values are indicated in 
parentheses.  *** = 1% confidence; ** = 5% confidence; * = 10% 
confidence. 
What is most noteworthy about labor-union-fund lead plaintiffs is 
that they strongly correlate with cash-for-stock deals.409  As noted earlier, 
institutional lead plaintiffs (except public-pension funds) correlate with 
cash-for-stock deals.410  But the correlation between     labor-union funds 
and cash-for-stock transactions is far stronger than it is for other 
institutions.411  Labor unions target these transactions, and may also be 
successful at obtaining lead plaintiff appointments in them because the 
larger public-pension funds direct more of their attention to controlling-
shareholder transactions.412  As noted earlier, cash-for-stock deals deprive 
investors of future profits of the target.413  The potential for exploitation 
of such investors, and the accompanying legal protections offered to such 
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See supra Table 10 (Cash-for-Stock). 
410
See supra Table 8 (Cash/Stock); supra text accompanying note 355. 
411
Compare supra Table 10 (2.7-2.8 labor-union fund coefficient), with supra Table 8 
(0.73-0.92 institution coefficient). 
412
Compare supra Table 9 (Controlling Shareholder), with supra Table 9 (Cash-for-
Stock). 
413
See supra notes 353-60 and accompanying text. 
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investors by Delaware courts under Revlon, may make it attractive to 
litigate such deals.414   
A couple of points of comparison with public-pension funds are 
also worth making here.  As noted in Table 8, the involvement of 
institutions generally correlates with longer complaints and more 
complaints.415  Public-pension funds correlate with the former but not the 
latter,416 though they do correspond with more lead plaintiffs, for the 
reasons discussed above in Part IV.A.417  Labor-union funds correlate 
with more complaints, but not longer ones.418  This suggests that they 
apply in competitive cases, but cannot, or do not, succeed in getting their 
attorneys to draft longer and more detailed complaints.  Finally, like 
other institutions, target-market capitalization correlates with labor-union 
lead plaintiffs, less strongly than for public-pension funds, and more 
strongly than for other institutional types.419  Labor-union funds also 
target larger cases in which they have more at stake.420   
Because there are so few mutual-fund lead plaintiffs in the sample, 
there is little to be said about their non-participation in these suits.421  As 
discussed above, mutual funds face several conflicts in serving as lead 
plaintiffs that other institutional types do not face.422  These conflicts 
render them passive participants in these cases.423   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
414
See supra note 359 and accompanying text. 
415
See discussion supra Part V.A.; supra Table 8.  
416
See supra Table 9. 
417
See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
418
See supra Table 10. 
419
See supra Table 9A (Public-Pension Lead Plaintiffs by Target-Market 
Capitalization); Table 10 (Labor-Union Lead Plaintiff by Target-Market Capitalization); infra 
Table 11 (Private Non-Mutual-Fund Lead Plaintiffs by Target-Market Capitalization). 
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See supra Table 10. 
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See supra text accompanying notes 218-19, 224. 
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See discussion supra Part IV.A . 
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See supra text accompanying notes 241-42. 
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Table 11: Indicators of Private Non-Mutual-Fund Lead Plaintiffs 
 Model One 
# Complaints 0.297743 
(0.001)*** 
Target Market Cap -0.05498 
(0.545) 
Premium < 20% 0.670328 
(0.066)* 
Cash-for-Stock 0.52565 
(0.273) 
Go-Shop -1.8581 
(0.088)* 
Binary logistic regression with dependent-dummy variable for private 
funds.  *** = 1% confidence, ** = 5% confidence, * = 10% confidence. 
Finally, private non-mutual funds follow the overall pattern for 
institutions, targeting cases in which multiple complaints have been filed, 
in which the premium is below 20%, and avoiding Go-Shop 
provisions.424  Unlike other institutions, market capitalization of the target 
is not significant,425 suggesting that these funds target smaller deals.  Nor 
do deal characteristics other than premium and Go-Shops seem to 
matter.426  Finally, private non-mutual funds do not seem to make the 
effort to write longer complaints.427 
VI.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEAD PLAINTIFFS, LEAD COUNSEL, 
CASE CHARACTERISTICS, AND CASE OUTCOMES 
In this Section, I assess the outcome of greatest interest to 
shareholders, the increase in share price from the offer to the final price, 
and attorneys' fees. 
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See supra Table 11. 
425
Compare supra Table 9A, and supra Table 10, with supra Table 11. 
426
See supra Table 11. 
427
See supra Table 11; discussion supra Part V.A. 
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A.  Percentage Change From Offer to Final Price 
Table 12: Indicators of Percentage Increase from Offer to Final Price428 
 Model One Model Two 
(Completed 
Deals Only) 
Model Three 
Public-
Pension 
Dummy 
0.09394 
(0.087)* 
0.09047 
(0.056)* 
0.09885 
(0.055)* 
Friendly 0.0688 
(0.032)** 
0.01793 
(0.518) 
0.06857 
(0.029)** 
Cash-for-
Stock 
0.10757 
(0.010)** 
0.00934 
(0.803) 
0.09307 
(0.016)** 
Target Market 
Cap 
0.009274 
(0.283) 
-0.00277 
(0.712) 
0.010567 
(0.197) 
SPDR 500 
Change From 
Offer to Final 
0.45957 
(0.000)*** 
0.22142 
(0.011)** 
0.47529 
(0.000)*** 
Deal Close 0.18888 
(0.000)***  
0.15844 
(0.000)*** 
Derivative 0.0395 
(0.781) 
0.0338 
(0.771)  
Premium   -0.09257 
(0.278) 
Go-Shop   0.03821 
(0.538) 
Hostile   -0.04277 
(0.573) 
 
R-squared 
 
29.9% 7.1% 29.8% 
OLS regression with dependent variable=percentage change from offer 
to final price (pre-Lehman).  P-values in parentheses.  *** = 1% 
confidence; ** = 5% confidence; * = 10% confidence.   
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For transactions with multiple cases that remained unconsolidated, I included only 
the first case by filed date in assessing the change from offer to final price, to avoid 
overweighting these transactions in my results.  I included all cases in basic statistics.  
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The results show that public-pension funds correlate with an 
increase from the offer to the final price.429  I emphasize here that this 
result includes a control for overall market movements—the percentage 
change from the offer to the final price of the SPDR 500, an 
electronically-traded fund that tracks the S&P 500.430  This result 
potentially justifies the policy favoring selection of institutional-investor 
lead plaintiffs, at least insofar as this policy leads to the selection of 
public-pension funds.  One possible interpretation of this result is that 
public-pension funds do, in fact, improve representation for shareholders 
in these suits, much as the theory supporting their selection predicts.  
Public-pension funds are large institutional investors with substantial 
stakes in these cases, at least on an absolute basis.431  They therefore have 
"skin in the game".432  They have incentives to monitor class counsel and 
to make sure that the case is litigated properly because of their 
substantial dollar investments in the target (subject to the size of their 
investment in the acquirer, if any).433  They are fiduciaries with access to 
counsel, including, in some cases, the state attorney general's office or 
the city counsel's office.434  They are comparatively sophisticated, repeat 
consumers of legal services with established relationships with law firms 
and, in many instances, portfolio-monitoring arrangements with these 
firms.435  Such portfolio monitoring may allow the funds to play the law 
firms against each other in negotiating the best contracts for legal 
representation, and securing the highest quality work product.436  Their 
motivation and relative sophistication may actually result in improved 
prices for the shareholders they represent.437  They may make better 
litigation decisions.438  They may prevent the law firms that represent the 
class from expending too little effort, settling the case too quickly, or 
underinvesting in the litigation.  The law firms may also work harder to 
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See supra Table 12. 
430
See MUTUAL FUNDS REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK § 34:2 (West 
2012 ed., database updated through 2013) (defining the SPDR 500). 
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See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text. 
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See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text. 
433
See supra note 64. 
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See Webber, Plight, supra note 18, at 219. 
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See id. 
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See Perino, supra note 114, at 385-87 (describing reductions in attorneys fees due to 
negotiation by public-pension fund lead plaintiffs).  
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Cf. id. at 383-384, 390 (concluding the same in regards to public-pension fund 
participation in securities class actions). 
438
Cf. id. at 374. 
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please public-pension fund clients, given their potential to serve as repeat 
customers.  The funds may also have the political clout or the media 
savvy to attract attention to the case, or to exercise other levers of power 
that may compel the defendants to increase the offer price.  Public-
pension fund litigation skill, political clout, and media savvy may induce 
the target board to seek a price increase from the acquirer, and may 
induce the acquirer to grant it.      
Another potential interpretation of this result is that public-pension 
funds cherry-pick the best cases, that is, they obtain lead plaintiff 
appointments in those cases with the greatest likelihood that the final 
price will exceed the offer price.439  This could be because they select the 
cases with case attributes that correlate with good outcomes.440  It could 
also be that they select cases in which arbitrageurs will drive up the price 
above the initial offer price.441  I cannot rule out these possibilities, but 
there is evidence that cuts against them.442  First, in terms of cherry-
picking the best cases, there is little overlap between the variables that 
predict public-pension lead plaintiffs and the variables that predict 
increased share price.  For example, public-pension funds clearly target 
controlling-shareholder transactions, but litigation over such transactions 
does not significantly correlate with improved prices,443 whereas 
litigation with public-pension lead plaintiffs does.444  Other variables that 
one might associate with cherry-picking, such as the market 
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Some research on federal securities fraud class actions suggests that public-pension 
funds correlate with better outcomes for shareholders, even accounting for cherry-picking.  See 
Perino, supra note 114, at 369; see also Cheng et al., supra note 78, at 358; Choi et al., Do 
Institutions Matter?, supra note 117, at 892 ("[P]ublic pension[] [funds] tend[] to target both 
larger stakes cases and those with stronger evidence of fraud.").   
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See Perino, supra note 114, at 376-77. 
441
It is frequently the case that arbitrageurs drive the target price up after an offer is 
announced to somewhere above the initial target price but below the offer price, discounted by 
the risk that the deal will not close.  See, e.g., How Mergers and Acquisitions Affect Stock 
Prices, LEARNING MKTS., http://www.learningmarkets.com/how-mergers-and-acquisitions-
affect-stock-prices/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2013).  In a small number of cases arbitrageurs may 
drive the target price up even above the initial offer price.  Id.  How frequently this occurs is a 
matter of dispute.  See, e.g., Jan Jindra & Ralph A. Walkling, Speculation Spreads and the 
Market Pricing of Proposed Acquisitions, 10 J. CORP. FIN. 495, 501 n.9 (2004) (finding 
negative speculation spreads in 23% of cash tender offers from a sample of 362 deals in excess 
of $10 million in 1981-1995 (which predates the entry of institutional investors into deal 
litigation)).  Note that the Jindra and Walkling article does not address the effect of litigation 
on the pricing of proposed acquisitions.   
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See infra notes 443-50 and accompanying text. 
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See supra Table 9. 
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See supra Table 12. 
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capitalization of the target (a proxy for deal size)445 and cash-for-stock 
deals (which trigger Revlon duties)446, are controlled for here.  And still 
other variables that one might associate with cherry-picking—such as 
those associated with institutional lead plaintiffs generally, like low-
premium deals—are simply not significantly correlated with an increase 
from the offer to the final price.447  Similarly, many of the same variables 
that would predict cherry-picking of cases would predict cherry-picking 
of deals in which arbitrageurs drive up the price above the offer price.  
The premium, the number of bidders, the presence of controlling 
shareholders, whether the deal is hostile or friendly, and price changes 
prior to the offer have all been used as controls in research on 
speculation spreads, as they were here.448  Yet, the result for public-
pension funds persists even in the presence of these variables.449  Finally, 
as noted earlier, individual and small institutional lead plaintiffs with 
weaker cases and less experienced counsel avoid suit in Delaware 
because they are unlikely to obtain lead plaintiff and lead counsel 
appointments under the Hirt factors.450  Thus, the results here likely 
understate the correlation between public-pension lead plaintiffs and case 
outcomes like increased price. 
Deal structure also plays an important role in increasing share 
price.451  Here, cash-for-stock deals positively and statistically 
significantly correlate with improvements in the final price.452  One 
possible interpretation of these results is Delaware's favorable legal 
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See supra note 379 and accompanying text. 
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See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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In the case of arbitrageurs, the causation could also run the opposite way—
arbitrageurs could drive up prices because they see or anticipate a public-pension fund (or its 
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public-pension-fund litigation activity and arbitrageur activity. 
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See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Premiums in Stock-for-Stock Mergers and Some 
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(2003) (discussing that the inability to share in gains as a reason to pay premiums in cash-for-
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See supra Table 12. 
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regime for cash deals.453  Under Revlon, which applies in cash-out 
mergers, a board is subjected to enhanced scrutiny and is legally 
obligated to maximize share price.454  The Revlon risk faced in cash-out-
mergers by the target board directly, and by the bidder board for aiding 
and abetting a Revlon breach, may explain the bump in price.455  Note that 
stock-for-stock deals to do not correlate with such a bump.456 
Finally, friendly deals correlate with improved share price.457  In 
friendly deals, the bidder board is also subject to suit, usually on the 
grounds of aiding and abetting the target board's breaches of fiduciary 
duty, as noted above.458  Moreover, because both boards want to 
consummate the deal, the acquirer may be more willing to increase its 
price.459  In contrast, hostile deals usually involve the bidder board in a de 
facto alliance with the target's shareholders against the target board.460  In 
such deals, shareholders are litigating to try to force the target board to 
accept the bidder's offer, or at least to negotiate with the bidder, so the 
bidder may feel less need to increase its offer.461 
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See supra note 278 and accompanying text.  But see Bradley R. Aronstam & David 
E. Ross, Retracing Delaware's Corporate Roots Through Recent Decisions: Corporate 
Foundations Remain Stable While Judicial Standards Of Review Continue To Evolve, 12 DEL. 
L. REV. 1, 17 (2010) (noting a need for a "uniform standard" in mergers).   
454
See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180, 182 
(Del. 1986) (stating that a company's board faces an enhanced duty to maximize shareholder 
value at sale).   
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But see Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 196 (finding no substantial gains for 
shareholders in deals subject to transactional litigation when Revlon duties apply, despite the 
popular perception that such gains exist).  
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See id. at 147 (finding directors can negotiate a stock-for-stock deal and not trigger 
Revlon duties). 
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See supra Table 12. 
458
See, e.g., In re Lukens Inc. S'holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 734-35 (Del. Ch. 1999) 
(evaluating claim of aiding and abetting breach of Revlon duties and stating elements of the 
claim), aff'd sub nom. Walker v. Lukens, Inc., 757 A.2d 1278 (Del. 2000). 
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But see Thompson & Thomas, supra note 4, at 206 (finding that premiums proposed 
for hostile deals may be substantially higher than those in the friendly deals). 
460
See, e.g., Gregory R. Andre, Tender Offers for Corporate Control:  A Critical 
Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 865, 869, 889-95 (1987) (discussing 
target management's desire to retain control of the corporation, often in opposition to target 
shareholders' desire to sell their stock at a premium over market); see also Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. 
Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1388-91 (Del. 1995) (evaluating acquiring corporation and target 
shareholders' claim to enjoin target board's decision to repurchase its own stock in an effort to 
thwart the hostile offer); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 952, 954-55 
(Del. 1985) (establishing higher level of scrutiny for directors' actions in hostile bid situations 
because there is a greater chance directors may not act in shareholders' best interest). 
461
See, for example, Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949-51, where the tender offering minority 
shareholder filed a complaint to challenge target board's decision to self-tender in response to 
 
70 DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW [Vol. 38 
 
Naturally, whether the deal closes strongly predicts an increase in 
price.462  For this reason, in Model Two I report results only for deals that 
close.463  Note that in this Model, only the result of interest stands—the 
positive and statistically significant correlation between public-pension 
lead plaintiffs and an increase from the offer to the final price.464  This 
finding provides some additional support for the contention that public-
pension funds do more than just cherry-pick the best cases.465  Only the 
presence of these funds correlates with improved price.466  
B.  Top Plaintiff Law Firm Case Characteristics 
In Table 13, I assess the case characteristics affiliated with the top 
plaintiff law firms by number of appearances (Model One), excluding 
local counsel.467  I also assess the case characteristics affiliated with the 
top plaintiff law firms by number of appearances and reputation (Model 
Two), excluding local counsel.468 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
the hostile tender offer.  For a further example, see Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1385. 
462
See, e.g., How Mergers and Acquisitions Affect Stock Prices, supra note 441. 
463
See supra Table 12. 
464
See supra Table 12. 
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See supra notes 439-42 and accompanying text. 
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See supra Table 12. 
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See infra Table 13. 
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See infra Table 13.  These include Milberg, Wolf_Popper,_Schiffrin Barroway, 
Lerach Couglin, Bernstein, Liebhard, and Goodkind Labaton. 
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Table 13: Case Characteristics Associated with Top Plaintiff Law Firms 
(Excluding Local Counsel) 
 Model One Model Two 
# Complaints 0.497979 
(0.000)*** 
0.721016 
(0.000)*** 
Complaint Length -0.02074 
(0.246) 
-0.01895 
(0.302) 
Friendly 1.21259 
(0.0002)*** 
1.69 
(0.000)*** 
TargetMCAP -0.05944 
(0.517) 
0.026786 
(0.94) 
Post-Cox -0.32289 
(0.382) 
-1.30303 
(0.001)*** 
 
Binary logistic regression with dependent variable dummy for top 5 
plaintiff firm.  This data is Pre-Lehman and P-values are indicated in 
parentheses.  *** = 1% confidence; ** = 5% confidence; * = 10% 
confidence.  Cash-for-stock was dropped as a control variable here 
because it was never significant in any model pertaining to plaintiff law 
firms.  The dependent variable for Models One was the top plaintiff law 
firms by number of appearances, excluding Delaware counsel.  The 
dependent variable for Model Two included the top plaintiff law firms by 
number of appearances and by reputation. 
Perhaps the most notable result in Table 13 is that the market 
capitalization of the target does not significantly correlate with a top 
plaintiff law firm.469  Contrary to popular belief, the most active plaintiff 
law firms do not simply bring suit in the largest deals.470  Of course, they 
do not avoid them either.471  And before congratulating these firms for 
their perspicacity in case selection, it is troubling to observe that such 
firms negatively correlate with complaint length—they write shorter, less 
thoughtful complaints.472  These results are statistically significant for 
firms by reputation, and just shy of significant for firms by number of 
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appearances (though I note that the coefficients here are negative as 
well).473  This suggests that the top players are quick filers looking to 
grab a case, and not engaging in thoughtful case selection.  But there is 
an important caveat to this point.  The result flips when it is interacted 
with an institutional lead plaintiff.474  Thus, in cases in which there is both 
an institutional lead plaintiff and a top plaintiff law firm, whether it be by 
number of appearances or reputation, complaints are longer.475  Thus, the 
top plaintiff law firms write longer complaints for their better clients (or 
better cases).  In general, though, these firms often sue with individual 
lead plaintiffs.476  In unreported regressions, I find that there is no 
statistically significant correlation between top law firms and 
institutional lead plaintiffs generally, or any particular type of 
institution.477 
Finally, the post-Cox variable represents cases filed in Delaware 
after the Delaware Court of Chancery's decision in In re Cox 
Communications Inc., Shareholders Litigation.478  In Cox, then-Vice 
Chancellor Strine granted the plaintiffs' lawyers only one-quarter of the 
$5 million in requested fees, even though the defendants had consented 
to the fees.479  The case was viewed as the first in a series of fee-cutting 
cases that some sources have cited for the tendency of some firms to 
bring mergers-and-acquisitions cases outside of Delaware.480  Although 
this Cox variable was not significant for the most frequent lead counsel 
in Delaware mergers-and-acquisitions cases, it does negatively correlate 
with elite firms, suggesting that these firms may have taken some of their 
business elsewhere in the aftermath of Cox.481 
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See supra Table 13. 
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Pearson correlation between institutional lead plaintiffs interacted with top plaintiff 
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2014] PRIVATE POLICING OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 73 
 
C.  Attorneys' Fees 
Table 14 below demonstrates that public-pension funds negatively 
correlate with attorneys' fees granted.482  The results are statistically 
significant in both models, which vary only by whether one includes the 
most frequent law firm participants or just elite law firm participants.483  
The regressions control for other factors that might impact attorneys' 
fees, including relevant deal characteristics, the target's market 
capitalization, the overall market movement, the change in the deal price 
subsequent to the offer, if any, and attorney hours worked.484 
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Table 14: Attorneys' Fees (Natural Log) 
 
 Model One Model Two 
Public-Pension 
Dummy 
-0.14896 
(0.018)** 
-0.13267 
(0.035)** 
Elite Plaintiffs Firms -0.06704 
(0.091)*  
Top 5 Plaintiff Law 
Firms  
-0.05896 
(0.145) 
Friendly 0.05239 
(0.175) 
0.05112 
(0.189) 
Cash-for-Stock -0.02896 
(0.550) 
-0.02992 
(0.540) 
Target Market Cap 0.0042 
(0.727) 
0.00369 
(0.761) 
SPDR Change from 
Offer to Final 
0.1494 
(0.255) 
0.1677 
(0.226) 
Deal Close -0.01202 
(0.838) 
-0.01965 
(0.742) 
Change from Offer 
to Final Price 
-0.05041 
(0.601) 
-0.06551 
(0.497) 
Attorney Hours 1.51E-05 
(0.169) 
1.13E-05 
(0.309) 
R-squared 
 
24.2% 23% 
OLS regression with dependent variable the natural log of granted 
attorneys' fees and expenses.  *** = 1% confidence; ** = 5% confidence; 
* = 10% confidence.   
These results are consistent with the idea that public-pension funds 
should be able to bargain for lower attorneys' fees, for several reasons.485  
First, because of portfolio monitoring by multiple law firms, the funds 
are well positioned to force the firms to compete against one another to 
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See, e.g., Perino, supra note 114, at 384 ("Public pensions that are sophisticated 
repeat players should be able to bargain for lower attorney fees than other types of lead 
plaintiffs. Plaintiff's attorneys should also be willing to compete for public pension fund 
business as a way to increase the likelihood of becoming lead counsel in large and lucrative 
class actions."). 
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win the lead counsel role.486  They will obtain bids from multiple law 
firms to represent them in the case.487  Law firms may be willing to cut 
their fees for public-pension-fund clients not only because the firms face 
competition, but because the public-pension funds are attractive clients 
with large holdings who may become repeat players in litigation.488  The 
public-pension funds may also be able to secure lead plaintiff 
appointments in larger, higher-stakes cases where the potential fee 
awards may be greater in absolute terms, even if they are smaller in 
relative terms.489  Trustees who serve on public-pension-funds boards 
may also serve as a valuable source of law firm referrals to other public-
pension trustees with whom they interact at professional and educational 
conferences.490 
As with the finding in Table 12 for the change from offer to final 
price, only public-pension funds correlate with the outcome of interest, in 
this instance, lower attorneys' fees.491  The results in Tables 12 and 14 set 
public-pension funds apart from other institutional investors.492  As 
discussed more fully below, while I find some evidence that institutional 
investors generally appear to be selecting and bringing the cases that, ex 
ante, we would want them to, public-pension funds alone correlate with 
an improved outcome for shareholders in these cases.493  
VII.  CONCLUSION 
This Article demonstrates that institutions have accepted 
Delaware's invitation to serve as lead plaintiffs in transactional class and 
derivative actions.  It shows that public-pension funds and labor-union 
funds have become the leading institutional participants in these cases, 
and that public-pension funds in particular correlate with the outcomes of 
greatest interest to shareholders: an increase from the offer to the final 
price, and lower attorneys' fees.  Even taking a restrained and skeptical 
view of the evidence presented here, one would still conclude that 
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institutional investors are, if little else, cherry-picking the best cases, at 
least when their case selection is viewed ex ante.  They target larger, 
cash-for-stock, low-premium deals, and they correlate with longer 
complaints, which reflect greater attorney effort.  As noted earlier, 
public-pension funds target cases involving controlling shareholders.  
From this ex ante perspective, these are the cases one would likely 
cherry-pick.  Larger deals mean more money at stake for the class, for 
the lead plaintiff, and for the attorneys.  Cash-for-stock deals trigger 
Revlon duties that are favorable to plaintiff shareholders.  Lower-
premium deals are more vulnerable to attack because they look like the 
acquirer is underpaying for the target.  And controlling-shareholder 
transactions trigger acute concerns about exploitation of inside 
information by company insiders to favorably time an acquisition at the 
expense of minority shareholders.  Thus, institutions target cases with 
more dollars at stake, less attractive deal characteristics, and legal 
remedies available to redress the transactions' shortcomings—the same 
cases any rational plaintiff would target.   
Even if we conclude that the funds cherry-pick the best cases and 
add no other value, this may be enough to justify the policy favoring the 
selection of institutional lead plaintiffs, at least insofar as they cherry-
pick the best cases, and not merely deals in which arbitrageurs would 
drive up the price anyway.  If nothing else, under the cherry-picking 
theory, institutional investors serve as an early screen of case quality.  
Simply by agreeing to serve as a lead plaintiff, they send a signal of case 
quality to the market, to the defendants, to the court, and to the class of 
shareholders that they represent.  This point is brought into relief when 
one recalls that the data could have come out differently.  For example, it 
is possible that there could have been no correlation between case 
characteristics and institutional lead plaintiffs, suggesting haphazard and 
thoughtless case selection, or case selection that correlated only with the 
interests of attorneys, not shareholders.  
But some of the evidence suggests that institutional investors do 
more than cherry-pick.  Even accounting for deal characteristics 
associated with cherry-picking of either cases or deals in which 
arbitrageurs would drive up the price, public-pension funds correlate 
with an improvement from the offer price to the final price.  As discussed 
above, this could be because public-pension funds are superior litigators, 
or that defendants are more willing to capitulate to their demands even if 
they are not actually better litigators.  Moreover, this Article presents 
evidence that institutional investors, particularly public-pension funds, 
exercise independent judgment both when selecting and when 
2014] PRIVATE POLICING OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 77 
 
monitoring their lawyers.  Most importantly, public-pension funds 
correlate with lower attorneys' fees, suggesting more active monitoring 
of class counsel.  
At a minimum, then, Delaware's policy favoring the selection of 
institutional-investor lead plaintiffs appears to be working, at least 
because institutions do seem to cherry-pick the best cases, which is itself 
of value as an early indicator of case quality.  This Article also offers 
some empirical support for the view that public-pension funds, in 
particular, improve outcomes for shareholders for reasons that may go 
beyond cherry-picking and that are at least partially attributable to the 
funds themselves:  their litigation skills, their reputation, their monitoring 
of class counsel, or all three. 
